



COURSEPACK JUNE 27 - JULY 17, 2013/1434 KONYA, TURKEY



# 'AQIDAH

# THE BEAUTIFUL UNBORED PEARL IN THE SCIENCE OF GOD'S UNITY Al-Kharida al-Bahiyya

By Shaykh Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-'Adawī al-Dardīr

Translated and Taught by Ustadh Omar Qureshi





# **'AQIDAH SYLLABUS**

# Session 1 (Lines 1-8)

Introduction to 'Aqidah Introduction to the text and author Shaykh Nuh's Kalam and Islam

# Session 2 (Lines 9–10)

Rational propositions Necessary Impossible Possible Rational Proposition Chart

# Session 3 (Lines 11-16)

That which it is an obligation for one of legal age to know About God About the Messengers

# Session 4 (Lines 17-21)

The temporal nature of the cosmos The contrary of temporality is pre-eternity Being predicated with existence is of the necessary attributes of God Every effect leads to its cause

# Session 5 (Lines 22–24)

The attribute of the essence, *Sifa nafsiyya* Existence The five attributes of negation, *Sifaat salbiyya* Begininglessness Everlastingness Self Subsistence Dissimilarity to created things

## Session 6 (Lines 25–31)

Continuation of the five attributes of negation Absolute oneness His essence Attributes Acts Causation Natural causation Necessary and sufficient causation Secondary causation Shaykh Nuh's article on evolution Why these five negative attributes are necessary for God Infinite regress A vicious circle

# Session 7 (Lines 32-35)

Seven qualitative attributes Knowledge Life Power Will The difference between Divine Will and the Divine Command The four scenarios

## Session 8 (Lines 36-42)

Continuation of the seven qualitative attributes Speech Hearing Seeing Attributes and their relations What we mean by speech, no consonants or vowels

## Session 9 (Lines 43–50)

That which is impossible of God Why those things are considered impossible That which is possible of God Eternal damnation and eternal happiness Must God do what is in the best interests of mankind Shaykh Nuh's article on suffering and Divine Wisdom The Beatific vision

## Session 10 (Lines 51–53)

That which is necessarily true of the Messengers Integrity Truthfulness Conveyance Intelligence That which is impossible of the Messengers That which is possible of the Messengers Issues surrounding specific Messengers and these points

#### **Session 11** (Lines 54–55)

The doctrines that are known solely through scripture *(Sam'iyyaat)* and that which is obligatory to hold true The inquisition The assemblage The reward The punishment The Resurrection The Traverse The Scales

## Session 12 (Lines 55-57)

Continuation of the doctrines that are known solely through scripture (Sami'yyaat) and that which it is obligatory to hold true The Pool The inferno Heaven Jinnkind Angels Prophets Houris Everlasting youths Saints Orthodoxy, schools, and sects Justice Muhammad Taqi al-Uthmani's response to questions posed in The Amman Message

# Session 13 (Lines 58-61)

The testimony of faith containing all of this that was mentioned The merit of its mention and remembrance Practical application and states of the heart The ethical implications of this 'aqidah Having the state of fear predominate Repenting to God often for disobedience Not despairing

#### Session 14 (Lines 62–63)

Continuation of ethical implications and states of the heart Gratitude for God's blessings Being patient with the trials God sends God's decree (qada) God's foreordainment (qadr) Issues surrounding predestination, Divine decree, and free will Article on predestination and free will

#### **Session 15** (Lines 64–69)

Continuation of ethical implications and states of the heart Submitting to God Following the way of devoted scholars Cleansing the heart of all other than God Going against the ego Praying at the pre-dawn time Reflection Constant remembrance Avoiding all acts of disobedience Mindfulness of Allah at all times Asking Allah for a good ending

## Session 16 (Lines 70–71)

The end of the treatise Questions and Answers

## BIOGRAPHY

#### Imam Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936)

#### by Shaykh Hamza Yusuf

Imam Ibn 'Ashir states at the outset of his didactic poem that it is based upon "the creed of al-Ash'arī," the descendent of the Prophet's companion Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī 🏂, whose name was Abū al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī b. Ismā'īl b. Ishāq al-Ash'arī. He was born in Basra, Iraq in 260 AH/874 CE. He was a brilliant student of theology and considered to be the best student of the Rationalist master Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī (d. 303/915). The Muslim world during his early life was filled with sects and diverse views about creed and law. An organized and formal articulation of core Muslim beliefs had not been accepted throughout the Muslim world despite some previous attempts such as those of Imam Abū Hanīfah (d. 150/767) and Imam al-Țaḥāwī (d. 321/933) following in his footsteps. Abū al-Hasan's thought, however, marks a turning point. Perhaps this was a result of his mastery of the beliefs of, and his leadership within, the most widespread and influential heterodox group, the Rationalists (al-mu<sup>c</sup>tazilah). Dr. Montgomery Watt admits, "European scholars in the nineteenth century gradually began to form some idea of the development of Islamic thought, they realized that the theology of al-Ash<sup>c</sup> arī marked a turning point. Up to his time there seemed to have been nothing but the wrangling of sects, whereas with him there came into being a rationalistic form of Sunnite theology which has persisted ever since." His effect on the direction of Sunni scholarship and theology was vast. He was profoundly fortunate in having brilliant students and to be living at a time when theology was not only flowering but producing its deepest thinkers that would lay the foundations for theology in Islam until the present day.

Different accounts have been narrated as to why he actually left the Rationalists and not only began to defend traditional positions but also vehemently oppose his former teachers. The story of the three brothers is most likely apocryphal. The more convincing explanation is an account that states that the Prophet & actually came to him in a series of dreams explaining to him the error of their ways. This led him to actually announce to the people in the central mosque of Basra that he was no longer a Rationalist and opposed their views and would expose their fallacies. He is recorded to have said,

Whoever knows me knows me, and for those who do not, I will tell you who I am. I am so-and-so the son of so-and-so; I used to say the Qur'an is created and that God will not be seen with our vision in the next world. I also believed we create our evil deeds ourselves, but I am turning to God in repentance. I believe I have a response to the Rationalists, and I will expose their faulty understanding. Ibn Khallikān said about him in Wafayāt al-aʿyān, *"The Rationalists held their heads very high until God brought forth al-Ashʿ arī and constrained them in sesame funnels."* After leaving al-Jubbā'ī, he moved to Baghdad and studied with the Shāfiʿī scholar Imam al-Marwazī (d. 340/951) and used to sit in his circle on Fridays in the central mosque, al-Manşūr. Although he considered himself al-Marwazī's student, it did not prevent him from using his own mind, being critical, and reasoning for himself. He was a righteous man who lived off the proceeds of a farm that he inherited from his grandfather. As for his intellectual positions, the juristic school to which he adhered is not known for certain, and different schools claim him for their own. As for his creedal positions, they are well known with the exception of some debate about certain statements in his book, al-Ibānah, which were probably interpolated later by some Anthropomorphists (*al-mushabbihah*), as they are inconsistent with his other writings and those of his direct students.

He left behind several works; some claim they reach three hundred. Some of them are as follows:

- Imāmat al-Şiddīq Concerns the rightful succession of Abū Bakr.
- **Radd** <sup>c</sup>alā al-mujassimah A refutation of the Anthropomorphists.
- **Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn** One of his most important creedal expositions.
- Al-ibānah fī uṣūl al-diyānah

Definitely a work of his that explains his creed, but the current editions have statements that the Ash<sup>c</sup>arīs reject as being from the imam himself.

Imam Abū al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī is the expounder of the school of theology that came to be considered one of the two rightly-guided schools of theology among the People of the Prophetic Way and the Majority of Scholars (ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā<sup>c</sup>ah) alongside the slightly different school on incidental issues of Imam Abū al-Mansūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). A third school, however, should be acknowledged, and that is the Atharī school, which basically comprises the Hanafī school and the early Ash'arī creeds that did not have the speculative positions taken later by the third generation of Ash'arī scholars, such as Imam al-Bāqillānī and others. This third school follows a strict Qur'anic creed that prefers not to investigate the knotty issues or engage in refutations of heterodoxical or heretical sects. It is best represented in the West by Ibn 'Abd al-Barr and in the East by Imam al-Tahāwī. It is important to note that many who are ignorant of scholastic history today decry the Ash'arī school and claim that they are deviant. A simple study of Islamic scholastic history will reveal that they are the defenders of orthodoxy and have been recognized as such by all of the rightly guided scholars of Islam for the last one thousand years. A short list of adherents to the Ash'arī school should suffice in revealing the their position as normative and orthodox:

- Imam al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1012) Kitāb al-talkhīş fī <sup>c</sup>ilm uşūl al-fiqh
- Imam al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066) Kitāb al-sunan al-kubrā
- Imam al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) al-Burhān fi uşūl al-fiqh
- Imam al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) al-Mustaşfā min 'ilm al-uşūl

- Imam Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArabī (d. 543/1148) Aḥkām al-Qur'ān
- Imam Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) al-Maḥşūl fī 'ilm uşūl al-fiqh
- Imam al-Qurțubī (d. 671/1273) al-Jāmi<sup>c</sup> li aḥkām al-Qur'ān
- Imam al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) Majmū<sup>c</sup> sharḥ al-muhadhdhab and Sharḥ Saḥīḥ Muslim
- Imam 'Izz b. 'Abd al-Salām (d. 678/1279) Qawā'id al-aḥkām fī maşāliḥ al-anām
- Imam al-Baydāwī (d. 685/1286) Anwār al-tanzīl wa asrār al-ta'wīl
- Imam al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310) Madārik al-tanzīl wa ḥaqā'iq al-ta'wīl
- Imam Ibn Juzayy al-Kalbī (741/1340) Taqrīb al-wuşūl ilā 'ilm al-uşūl
- Imam Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355) Ibhāj fī sharḥ al-minhāj
- Imam Ibn Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449)
   Fath al-Bārī fī sharh sahīh al-Bukhārī
- Imam al-Suyūțī (d. 911/1505) al-Durr al-manthūr fī al-tafsīr bi al-ma'thūr He wrote more than 500 books.
- Imam Ibn Hajar al-Haytamī (d. 974/1567) Tuhfat al-muḥtāj li sharḥ al-minhāj

These are only a few of the great scholars of our religion who followed faithfully the creed of the Ash<sup>c</sup>arī school. Many of them were great theologians who developed the school themselves and had, in some instances, dissenting views about certain positions such as Imam al-Ghazzālī. But they all maintained the highest regard and defense of the school against those who would slander it.

#### In the name of Allah, Most Merciful and Compassionate

- Says the one hopeful of the Omnipotent One's mercy, Namely, Ahmad famously known as al-Dardīr,
- 2 All praise to God, Most High, the One, The Omniscient, the Unique, Independent, the Magnanimous.
- 3 And the most complete blessings and peace, Upon the Prophet, the chosen one, most noble,
- 4 And his family and pure Companions, In particular his companion in the cave.
- 5 This is a [tract] on exalted [points of] doctrine, I have named The Beautiful Unbored Pearl.
- 6 It is light [to read] and small in size,Yet it is immense in the knowledge [it contains].
- 7 This tract will suffice if you intend to stick with what is minimally [required], For it contains the essence of this science.
- 8 It is God's acceptance of this work that I seek,And Him I ask to benefit [others] and to cover acts of disobedience.

- 9 The types of rational propositions are only the necessary then the impossible
- 10 then the possible, the third type. So understand this — may you be gifted the pleasure of understanding!



- It is an obligation [from God] upon one who is morally responsible, To know God Most High; so know [the nature of your obligation].
- 12 Namely, to know what is necessary and impossible along with what is possible of Him, the Exalted.
- 13 [It is an obligation to know], in the like manner, the Messengers of God, May the greetings of God be upon them [all]!
- 14 What is rationally necessary is that which cannot intrinsically cease to exist, so seek out [your Lord] humbly [for useful knowledge].
- 15 The rationally impossible is that which cannot intrinsically exist, contrary to the first type.
- 16 And all entities that may not exist or [may] exist intrinsically are rationally possible as is evident.

- 17 Then know that the cosmos, namely everything other than God Most High, All Knowing,
- 18 Is, without doubt, temporal, and indigent. This is due to change taking place therein.
- 19 The cosmos being temporal is its coming into existence after being non-existent; The contrary of temporality is what is termed pre-eternity.
- 20 Thus, know that being predicated with existence is Of the necessary [attributes] of the One [rightfully] worshipped.
- 21 [This is so], as it is obvious that every effect leads to its cause. So reflect [on the wonders of heavens and earth].



- 22 This attribute (existence) is termed the attribute of the essence (*sifa nafsiyya*), which is followed by the five attributes of negation (*sifat salbiyya*).
- 23 And they are [being] intrinsically ① beginningless (qidam) know this well then ② everlastingness (baqā') then ③ self-subsistence (qiyam bi-nafs) may you attain God-fearingness!
- 24 [Then] ④ dissimilarity to [all] other, and ⑤ absolute oneness (*wahdaniyyah*) in His essence, and His lofty attributes,



- **25** and His acts. Accordingly, causation  $(ta'th\bar{i}r)$  is for none other than the One, the Subduer, Majestic, Most High.
- 26 Thus, whoever upholds natural causation (*tab'*) or necessary and sufficient causation (*tillah*) is considered an unbeliever (*kafir*) according to the scholars of religion.
- 27 Also, one who upholds secondary causation, is an innovator so pay no attention to such a position.
- 28 Were He not possessing [these five attributes], it would necessitate Him being temporal and this is impossible so be upright!
- 29 For it would lead to an infinite regress (*tasalsul*) or a vicious circle (*dawr*) which are both patent impossibilities.
- **30** He is the Majestic, the Beautiful, the Patron, the Pure, the Holy and is the Lord Most High.
- 31 Transcendent is He of a locus and direction (*jiha*),And being connected or separated from [something] and from imprudence.

- 32 Then, to the one who reflects, there are seven qualitative attributes.They are His ① knowledge which encompasses all things,
- 33 Then (2) life, (3) power, and (4) will;All entities that come into being He has willed,
- 34 Even if He commanded the opposite of what has come about,For the divine will is other than the divine command so leave aside disputation.
- 35 From this you now know there are four types of entities in existence, so keep well to this understanding.



- 36 His (5) speech, (6) hearing and (7) seeing;
  He is God, the Agent (*fā'il*), the Uncompelled (*mukhtar*).
- 37 These attributes necessarily relate to [entities];Necessarily, perpetually except for [the attribute of] Life.
- 38 So knowledge, certainly, and sublime speech relate to all types [of rational propositions].
- 39 Power and will both relate to All possible realities, my righteous brother!
- 40 And be certain that His hearing and sight Relate to every perceptible existent.
- 41 All [of the qualitative] attributes are intrinsically eternal,For they are identical with the [divine] essence.
- 42 Furthermore, [God's] speech does not consist of consonants or vowels  $(hur\bar{u}f)$  Nor does [His speech] have word order as does ours.

- 43 And impossible [of God] are the contraries of the lofty attributes previously mentioned, So know this [well].
- 44 For if He did not possess these attributes,Then He would possess the contrary of these attributes.
- 45 And every being that possess the contrary of these attributes Is in the state of dire need [to bring it into existence].
- 46 While the One rightfully worshipped is not in need Of another [entity], Majestic is He, the Independent, the All-powerful.
- 47 It is possible for Him to bring or not to bring [something] into existence, or to commit [one] to [eternal] damnation or to [eternal] happiness.
- 48 One who holds that it is necessary for God to do what is in the best interests [of one] Has committed an [egregious] act of impropriety [towards God].
- **49** And be of full conviction my brother of the Beatific vision of God In eternal Paradise; [a vision] that does not bequeath full [and complete] comprehension.
- 50 For rationally, its possibility is admissible, And Scripture has furthermore provided evidence [of its occurrence].

- 51 And describe all the Messengers [necessarily] with ① integrity,
  ② truthfulness, ③ conveyance and ④ intelligence.
- 52 Impossible of them is the contrary of these attributes, And possible of them are attributes such as eating.
- 53 Them being sent is an act of sheer grace and mercyTowards all the worlds. Majestic be He, the Conferrer of blessings.



- 54 And it is obligatory to hold as true: the Inquisition ( $h\bar{\iota}s\bar{a}b$ ), The Assemblage, punishment and reward,
- 55 The resurrection, the traverse, the scales, The pool, the Inferno and Heaven,



- 55 The resurrection, the traverse, the scales, The pool, the Inferno and Heaven,
- 56 Jinnkind and Angels, and furthermore the Prophets, The Houris, the everlasting youths, and the saints,
- 57 And in all that has been transmitted from the Giver of Glad Tidings, In every ruling that is necessarily known.



- 58 All the rulings that have preceded are contained in the testimony of faith.
- 59 Thus, make much remembrance of it with the courtesy [it deserves], And you shall ascend by this remembrance to the highest stations.
- 60 Make [the state of] fear predominate hope, And take the path to your Lord without straying.
- 61 Renew [your] repentance for [any act of] disobedience,And do not despair of the Oft-forgiving's mercy.



- 62 Be ever grateful for His blessings [conferred], and be patient with the trials He sends.
- 63 For everything is by [His] decree (qada) and foreordainment (qadr), And there is no avoiding that which has been destined.



- 64 So submit to Him in order that you are saved, and closely follow the way of devoted scholars.
- 65 Cleanse the heart of all that is other [than Him],By going against the ego and praying at the time of pre-dawn,
- 66 [And with] reflection, constant remembrance, And avoiding all acts of disobedience,
- 67 [And] being mindful of Allāh in all circumstances, So that you ascend the waymarks of perfection.
- 68 And say with utter humility, "My Lord! Do not cut me off from You by anything that severs, and do not prevent me
- 69 From Your splendid secret which removes [true] blindness. And make (our) ending be sealed with goodness, O Most merciful of those with mercy!"

- 70 Praise be to God for completion of [this tract], And may the best of blessings and peace,
- 71 Be on the Hashemite Prophet, the Seal,And on his family and his noble companions.





1. What is the difference between 'aqidah and kalam?

'Аq	idah:
Ка	lam:
2.	According to Shaykh Nuh's article, why does kalam theology exist?
3.	According to Shaykh Nuh's article, what are the four points on the spectrum of right-wrong beliefs?
a)	
b)	
c)	
d)	

4.	Indicate	whether	the	following	statements	are	true or	false:
----	----------	---------	-----	-----------	------------	-----	---------	--------

There are no valid differences of opinion in belief.	т	F
"Unbelief" <i>(kufr)</i> consists in asserting that the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) lied about anything he conveyed, while "faith" is believing that he told the truth in everything he said.	т	F
Greater knowledge of the spectrum of right-wrong beliefs should bring about greater tolerance in the student for differences of opinion.	т	F

1. Define what is meant by a proposition.

2. Place a cheo	ckmark ne	xt to the three categories o	f proposition.
True or False		Legal	
Empirical		Rational	
Impossible		Objectionable	
Sound			
3. What are the	e three type	es of rational propositions?	Give an example of each.
2	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		·
a)			
Example:			
b)			
Example:			
c)			
Example:			

1. What is the first obligation upo	n a person?
2. Who is it obligatory upon?	
<ol> <li>Connect the term to its definition</li> </ol>	on:
Rationally Possible	That which cannot intrinsically cease to exist
Rationally Necessary	That which cannot intrinsically exist
Rationally Impossible	Entities that may not exist or may exist (intrinsically)
4. What are the three things that m	nust be known about God and the Messengers?
a)	

# 5. Give an example of something that you know to be rationally necessary, impossible, and possible.

b) \_\_\_\_\_

c) \_\_\_\_\_

Rationally	Necessary:
Rationally	mpossible:
Rationally	Possible:

1. Define what we mean by something being temporal.

2. Given the definition of temporal, is God temporal?

- 3. What is the contrary of that which is temporal?
- 4. How do we know that the cosmos is temporal?

5. Given how we know the cosmos is temporal what does that tell us about God?

- 6. What is the first necessary attribute of God?
- 7. What rational proof do we have to know that it (the above attribute) is necessarily true?

 Place a 'N' next to the attribute if it is an attribute of the essence, sifa Nafsiyya or place a 'S' next to the attribute if it is a attribute of negation, sifaat Salbiyya.

Self Subsistence	
Begininglessness	
Dissimilarity to Created Things	
Existence	
Everlastingness	
Absolute oneness	

2. Give a short definition of each of the five attributes of negation.

1)	 
2)	
3)	
4)	
5)	

#### 3. Give a rational proof for God being self-subsistent.

1.	Allah is absolutely one in His:
a)	
b)	
c)	
-	
2.	Define natural causation, sufficient causation, and secondary causation. Then specify whether believing in each is disbelief or innovation.
Na	tural:
<b>C</b>	
Su	ncient:
Seo	condary:
3.	Explain how the evolution issue directly relates to the question of causation.
4.	What reason does Imam Dardir mention for these five negative attributes being true?
5.	Define both tasalsul and dawr.
Ta	salsul:
Da	wr:
1. List the four scenarios that highlight the differences between Divine Will and Divine Command.

1)	
2)	
3)	
4)	
2.	List the four out of seven qualitative attributes taken in Session 7.
2.	List the four out of seven qualitative attributes taken in Session 7.
2.	List the four out of seven qualitative attributes taken in Session 7.
<ol> <li>2.</li> <li>1)</li> <li>2)</li> </ol>	List the four out of seven qualitative attributes taken in Session 7.
<ol> <li>2.</li> <li>1)</li> <li>2)</li> </ol>	List the four out of seven qualitative attributes taken in Session 7.
<ol> <li>2.</li> <li>1)</li> <li>2)</li> <li>3)</li> </ol>	List the four out of seven qualitative attributes taken in Session 7.
<ol> <li>2.</li> <li>1)</li> <li>2)</li> <li>3)</li> </ol>	List the four out of seven qualitative attributes taken in Session 7.
<ol> <li>2.</li> <li>1)</li> <li>2)</li> <li>3)</li> <li>4)</li> </ol>	List the four out of seven qualitative attributes taken in Session 7.
<ol> <li>2.</li> <li>1)</li> <li>2)</li> <li>3)</li> <li>4)</li> </ol>	List the four out of seven qualitative attributes taken in Session 7.

3. Indicate whether the following statements are true or false	e:	
God must will into existence anything He has the power to.	т	F
God knows what will occur before it occurs.	т	F
Since God knows what we are going to do before we do it this means that we do not have choice in our actions.	т	F
God has knowledge of generalities and not particulars.	т	F
Some entities come into existence even if God has not willed them.	т	F

1. List the three out of seven qualitative attributes taken in session 8.

a)	
b)	
c)	

2. Check the box if the given qualitative attribute necessarily relates to entities.

Knowledge		Speech	
Life		Hearing	
Power		Sight	
Will	0		

3. Explain the relationship between Allah's knowledge and all rational propositions.



1- What is the Arabic term for that which is:

Possible For God		
Impossible For God		
2- List three things that are impossible for God:		
a)		
b)		
c)		
3- Indicate whether the following statements are true or fals	e:	
The Quran is the uncreated Word of God	т	F
God must create	т	F
God must benefit His creation	т	F

4- Does God hear and see the way humans hear and see? If not, what is the difference between His sight and hearing and human sight and hearing?

### 5- What is the Beatific Vision?

6- Using Shaykh Nuh's article 'Suffering and Divine Wisdom', what is some of the wisdom behind trials and tribulations that are apportioned to individuals?

- 3- Indicate whether the following are True or False:

Messengers eat and may marry	т	F
All Messengers are also Prophets	т	F
All Prophets are also Messengers	т	F
God is obligated to send Prophets and Messengers	т	F

# **WORKSHEET 11 & 12**

1- Please complete the list of the sixteen doctrines (Sam'iyyat) that are obligatory to know:

1) The reward	9)
2) The Scales	10)
3) The Pool	11)
4) Jinnkind	12)
5) Saints	13)
6) The punishment	14)
7) Angels	15)
8) The Resurrection	16)

2- In the science of 'aqidah, what is the Arabic term for the opposite of Samiyyat?

3- Please give the definition of Prophethood and Messengerhood:

Prophethood:
•
Messengerhood
Messengernoou.
4 Mbet is the traverse?
+- Writal is the traverse?

5- What are the Arabic terms for The Scales, Saints, and The inquisition?		
The Scales		
The Saints		
The Inquisition		
6- Do all people go through The inquisition?		
7- Salvation is the reward for doing good on earth <b>T F</b>		
8- Circle all that are true about Jinnkind:		
Made of fire Always obedient to God		
Can't be Muslim		
9- Circle all that are true about Angels:		
Always obedient to God Can't be seen by the human eye		
Can't be on earth		
10-Circle the group that contains the names of the five Most Forbearant Prophets (Ulu al-Azim) Allah bless them all and grant them peace:		
Abraham, Moses, Jesus, John, Muhammad		
Joseph, Ismael, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad		
Abraham, Noah, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad		
11- Mention one reason from Justice Mufti Muhammad Taqi al-Uthmani's article on the dangers of declaring specific individuals as disbelievers .		



# FAMILY LAW

# BASED ON VARIOUS SOURCES OF CLASSICAL FIQH

Taught by Imam Afroz Ali





## **FAMILY LAW SYLLABUS**

## **Session 1**

#### Introduction to Marriage & Family; The Core Matters

This session will introduce the nature of marriage and family within the Islamic framework, as well as identify key issues and realities we need to be aware of in our times.

## **Session 2**

Laws of Marriage 1; Meeting prospective partners & Rules of Nikah This session will introduce the rulings pertaining to permissible conduct prior to marriage with a prospective partner, as well as the process for the Nikah, highlighting key differences between Schools.

## **Session 3**

**Laws of Marriage 2;** Rights & Responsibilities of Marriage The core rulings that define the values to be upheld in a successful marriage are discussed here in a practical way where the rulings are explained from an applied perspective.

# Session 4

**Introduction to Parenting;** Understanding Parenting Styles Based on the works of Imam Ghazzali, this session tests modern theories of parenting and provides and Islamic light and guidance for successful parenting styles.

## **Session 5**

**Qualities of Nurture-Parenting 1;** Five Elements of Nurturing Children Adopting from Imam Ghazali's Ihya and Ayyuhal Walad, and cross-referencing key aspects of known psychological facts, five key principles of nurturing are expounded upon.

## **Session 6**

**Qualities of Nurture-Parenting 2;** Five Elements of Nurturing Children Continued from above.

## Session 7

Introduction to Divorce; Avoiding Divorce at All Cost

This session focuses on the imperative to avoid divorce unless necessary, given it is amongst the most hated of permissible acts in the Sight of Allah.

## **Session 8**

Laws of Divorce; Rules of Divorce

The core rulings are explained, and differences between schools are highlighted. The session returns to imploring students to work on developing a successful marriage.

#### In the name of Allah, Most Merciful and Compassionate

#### 1 INTRODUCTION TO MARRIAGE & FAMILY

#### **Definition & Purpose of Marriage**

The divine purpose of marriage by understanding concepts of:

- Zawāj
- Qirān
- Nikah
- Mīthāqun ghalīđhan

Reflections on a number of *ahadīth* in reference to marriage

The top five reasons of failure of marriage amongst Muslim youth:

- Intimacy
- Finance and material ownership
- Religious values
- Abuse
- Inlaws

Five realities that makes finding marriage partners difficult:

- A global crisis
- Failure to indigenise our social space and living
- Misunderstood Islam
- Beyond culture
- Non-communal living



#### 2 LAWS OF MARRIAGE (1)

#### **Interaction & Meeting**

Rules of interaction and meeting:

- Privacy vs. private seclusion
- Language
- Conduct

Respecting cultural norms

Guidelines to conduct with opposite gender

Guidelines to the types of questions to ask and discussions to have

#### Nikah

Requirements of *Nikah* and key differences between the Schools by understanding:

- Age
- Consent
- Witnessing
- Guardian
- Bridal gift

The pre-marital contract

- Examples of permissible conditions
- Scope & limitations of the pre-marital contract

Conjugal responsibilities



#### 3 LAWS OF MARRIAGE (2)

## **<u>Rights & Responsibilities of Marriage</u>**

Wellbeing and safety

Stable function of the household & leadership

Financial obligations

#### Introduction to Stimuli-Responsive behaviour:

- Material
- Sensorial
- Intellectual
- Action
- Verbal



#### **4** UNDERSTANDING PARENTING STYLES

Imam Ghazzali's model of nurture-parenting:

- Master-pupil analogy
- Collaborative & experiential learning
- The cooperative role of parents

The Societal Quadrant:

- Pre-Islamic
- Makkan
- Early Madinan
- Late Madinan



#### **5** QUALITIES OF NURTURE PARENTING (1)

Understanding effective parenting styles

- Authoritarian
- Permissive
- Authoritative

## Understanding the five elements of nurture-parenting:

- 1. Gender
- 2. Instructional learning



## 6 QUALITIES OF NURTURE PARENTING (2)

Understanding the five elements of nurture-parenting (cont'd):

- 3. Informational learning
- **4.** Mentored learning
- 5. Excellence of character



## 7 INTRODUCTION TO DIVORCE

## An introduction to spousal conflict resolution

Understanding how pre-marital choices define post-marital conflicts



#### 8 RULES OF DIVORCE

Kinds of divorce:

- The best mode
- The Sunnah mode
- The innovated mode

Rules surrounding *khul*'

Retractable divorce & how it functions

- How retraction works
- Non-retractability of divorce and consequences



# THE FIQH OF FINANCES

# BASED ON VARIOUS SOURCES OF CLASSICAL FIQH

Taught by Imam Afroz Ali





# THE FIQH OF FINANCES SYLLABUS

## **Session 1**

Introduction to Money, Trade & Finance; Definitions

This session will introduce the subject of the nature of trade and finance, and offer a paradigm shift for the students regarding trade and economy.

# Session 2

**Laws of Trade 1;** Foundational Rulings of Trade This session will introduce students to the basic rulings of standard trade.

# **Session 3**

**Laws of Loans;** Foundational Rulings of Loans This session will introduce students to the basic rulings of standard loans, aiding them to have a number of sound assessment tools for loan products available in the market.

# Session 4

**Laws of Trade 2;** Advanced Principles of Trade Some of the common more complex trading tools and products are discussed and rulings and principles explained.

# Session 5

**The Destructive Force of** *Riba*; How *Riba* is destroying the world An set of empirical evidences will be shared to describe and explain the destructive forces of loan-based interest, and how it has destroyed the lives of humans all over the world.

# **Session 6**

**The Adab of Earning & Living;** The Ghazzalian Paradigm This session and the next will provide a summary study of Imam Ghazali's text Kitāb Ādāb al-Kasb wal-Ma'āsh.

# Session 7

#### Group Activity; A Paradigm Shift Exercise

The last session will involve students presenting on a group exercise presented to them in lesson 1, in order to discuss key steps we ought to take to change our lives to live more ethically.

## **1** INTRODUCTION TO MONEY, TRADE & FINANCE

## Understanding Key Concepts

Definitions & Purposes:

- Trade
- Economy
- Gratitude
- Consumer market vs. Distributive market

Higher Objectives of mu'amalāt



#### 2 LAWS OF TRADE (1)

#### Types & Conditions of Sale

Conditions of sale

- The seller
- The buyer
- The article
- The price
- The offer
- The acceptance

General types of sale:

- Bay'
- Ṣarf
- Salam
- Murābaħa
- Ijāra
- Qirāđ
- Shārika
- Muḍāraba

Basis for invalidation of sales:

- Prohibited type of article
- Usury
- Uncertainty, fraud and harm
- Conditions of contract leading to the above



#### 3 LAWS OF LOANS

## **<u>Rights & Responsibilities of Marriage</u>**

Wellbeing and safety

Stable function of the household & leadership

Financial obligations

#### Introduction to Stimuli-Responsive behaviour:

- Material
- Sensorial
- Intellectual
- Action
- Verbal


#### 4 LAWS OF LOANS & USURY

Definitions and conditions for loans

- Difference between financial loan and lending and article
- Reflections on Qur'anic verses

Understanding Usury

- Distinction between profits from trade and loan
- Types of Usury



#### 5 LAWS OF TRADE & LOANS IN PRACTICE

A brief case study of a compliant financial lending instrument

Reviewing the stock market

- Share trading
- Hedge funds and options trading
- Ethical investment



### 6 THE ADAB OF EARNING & LIVING (1)

Introduction to Imam Ghazzali's text, Kitāb Ādāb al-Kasb wal-Ma'āsh

Virtues of Work & exhortation towards it

Justice in Transactions



#### 7 THE ADAB OF EARNING & LIVING

Excellence in Transaction as a means to felicity

The merchant's concern for their soul & religion

#### 8 GROUP ACTIVITY

Please attend Lesson 1 to specifically receive a group exercise for this course.



# SPIRITUAL CULTIVATION (TASAWWUF)

# BASED ON "THE HELPING GUIDE" al-Murshid al-Muʿīn

By Imam 'Abd al-Wāḥid ibn 'Āshir

Taught by Ustadh Hamzah Chaudhry





## **SPIRITUAL CULTIVATION - Tasawwuf**

## **Session 1**

Introduction The Journey of Ten Thousand Miles Begins With One Step Tawbah Learning to Worship Allāh As If You See Him: *Taqwā* 

## **Session 2**

Guarding the Pathways to the Heart: Eyes, Ears and Tongue Taking Control of the Carnal Desires of the Stomach Taking Control of Sexual Desires

## **Session 3**

Islām: Levels of Submission to the Divine Cancers of the Heart: Ostentation and Jealousy Cancers of the Heart: Egomania and Love of Leadership

## **Session 4**

The Corner Stone of Understanding: Preference for the  $\bar{A}khirah$ Finding and Properly Benefitting From Guidance on One's Spiritual Path Vehicles of the of Ascent:  $Fur\bar{u}'$  and  $Naw\bar{a}fil$ 

## **Session 5**

Tools of the Spiritual Trade: Struggling with the *Nafs* Tools of the Spiritual Trade: Fear and Hope Tools of the Spiritual Trade: Trusting in Allāh and Doing Without

## **Session 6**

Love: The Life of the Heart What Differentiates the Saints From the Common People? *Ikhlās* 

## BIOGRAPHY

#### Imam Abū Qāsim al-Junayd (225/840 - 297/910)

by Shaykh Hamza Yusuf

Imam al-Junayd b. Muḥammad b. al-Junayd al-Baghdādi was born around 225 AH/840 CE in Baghdad. At the time of his birth, the city of Baghdad was the capitol of the Muslim world politically, economically, academically, culturally, and spiritually. He was born during the caliphate of the Rationalists' (*al-mu<sup>c</sup> tazilah*) patron and defender, al-Ma'mūn. The intellectual and religious environment was one of intense debate and discussion. Many Christians lived in the city and participated in the intellectual activity there. The Muslim creedal sects were just beginning to formulate with the Rationalists having the earliest influence and making a huge impact. The worldliness of the city and its luxuries also led to a reaction of asceticism among some of the religiously minded people. Sufism (*taşawwuf*) as an articulated science had yet to formalize but people were certainly discussing and practicing many of the core components of what would soon be articulated as the doctrine of al-Junayd.

#### Childhood

As far as we know, al-Junayd's father was a glassmaker who originally came from Nahawand in Persia. He died while al-Junayd was still a child and his mother raised him in the guardianship of his distinguished maternal uncle Sarī al-Saqaţī (d. ca. 253/867), who was known to be a pious and learned man of widespread repute. Sarī had been the student of the famous convert Ma<sup>c</sup>rūf al-Karkhī (d. 200/815), who was originally a Christian, converted to Islam, and became one of the religion's great saints. Imam al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) says about Ma<sup>c</sup>rūf, *"He, the leader among the detached ones, the blessing of his age.... He was of Christian parents who sent him to a teacher who would say to him, "Say God is a trinity." And he would reply, "No, God is One." The teacher would beat him but he was unrelenting in his assertion and would be beaten more until he fled. His parents eventually became Muslims also.*"

Imam al-Junayd seems to have been an extremely precocious child with spiritual inclinations from an early age. One story informs us that he was seven and playing in the courtyard where Sarī was discussing the concept of gratitude with some scholars. Sarī turned to the playing boy and said, *"Child, tell me what is gratitude?"* Al-Junayd looked up from his playing and replied, *"Gratitude is that one not abuse one's blessings in disobedience to God."* 

#### Adolescence

Imam al-Junayd learned the Qur'an by heart as a child and studied the preliminary sciences of his day including grammar. He also began to study law with the master jurist and eponym for his independent school of law, Ibrāhim b. Khālid b. al-Yamān Abū Thawr al-Kalbī (d. 246/860), who was ranked with the great Imams of the schools as a scholar capable of independent juridical reasoning (mujtahid mutlaq). Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855), a contemporary and friend, considered him an upright and master scholar. Ibn Mulaqqan (d. 230/845) reports, "Al-Junayd used to give fatwa in the gathering of Abū Thawr in the master's presence at twenty years of age." Al-Junayd's mastery of law and its ancillary sciences must have been vast at such an early age for him to be allowed to give legal opinion in the presence of the formulator of the school.

At around the same age, Imam al-Junayd was also given to the company of the Sufi psychologist and scholar al-Hārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), who is the first to have made an investigation into thoughts and their nature, classifying them and formulating strategies for controlling superfluous and harmful thoughts. Al-Junayd would invite him to the family home for food and company, and used to call him "uncle." Al-Junayd said that al-Muḥāsibī used to take him for walks out in the open among people and discuss matters related to gnosis and spirituality. Imam al-Junayd relates that once al-Ḥārith came to him and said, "*Come out and walk with me*," to which the Imam replied, "*You want to take me from my retreat here and safety from myself and thrust me into the streets with all their faults and temptations*?" Al-Muḥāsibī said, "*Come and don't be afraid*." Imam al-Junayd said, "*I went out with him and it was as if the streets were empty; I didn't see anything distasteful*." They then sat and al-Muḥāsibī said, "*Ask me what you like*." And al-Junayd replied, "*I don't have any questions*." To which he said, "*Then ask me whatever comes to your mind*," and al-Junayd would find questions arising about which he would ask and al-Muḥāsibī would reply. Al-Junayd would then return home and write down what had occurred.

Once Sarī al-Saqaţī asked al-Junayd about what he would do in the case of his uncle's death. He replied that he would go to al-Muḥāsibī, and Sarī told him that he had made a good choice but warned that he should be critical of his theology. Imam Aḥmad also criticized Imam al-Muḥāsibī for his propensity to respond to the Rationalists using their own methods of reasoning. At around the age of thirty, al-Junayd's uncle encouraged him to establish a circle in the grand mosque al-Manṣūr. Al-Junayd was unsure about starting his own circle but was encouraged to do so by over a score of great scholars at the time. Despite so many people asking him to teach publically, he still felt unprepared until he said, *"I saw the Messenger of God in a dream and he said, 'Go out and speak in public.' He awoke and immediately went to his uncle who said to him, "Well, you didn't believe me and now you have been told. And remember, the command of the Messenger is definitive.* "The very next day, al-Junayd began teaching in the mosque.

## Imam al-Junayd's Circle

At that time, all teaching occurred in the mosques, which served as colleges as well. In fact, it was not until a hundred and fifty years later in 459/1066 that the first university of Baghdad that was independent of a public mosque was established by its eponym, the Seljuk minister, Niẓām al-Mulk. Moreover, the public teaching at al-Junayd's time was limited to law, hadith, and Qur'an and its exegesis (*tafsīr*). He is perhaps the first Sufi to teach publicly in Muslim history with the widespread recognition of his peers among the exoteric masters of Qur'anic exegesis, hadith, and law. In fact, when he began teaching publicly many well-established scholars gathered to attend his lectures. Among them was the master Shāfiʿī jurist Imam Abū al-ʿAbbās b. Surayj (d. 306/918). After hearing him speak, someone asked him what he thought, and Ibn Surayj replied, *"I don't really know what to say other than that I sense in his words a power that is not the assault of falsehood.*" Obviously, this response is of someone unaccustomed to hearing the inspired words of a spiritual luminary and genius such as al-Junayd, who truly introduced novel ways of looking at the Qur'an and the Sunnah beyond the more traditional legal parameters but rather as vehicles for illumination of the heart. Later the same scholar would say to 'Alī al-Ḥaddād after he made a remark about Ibn Surayj's novel approach to legal theory and its branches, *"It is from the blessing of sitting with Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd."* 

Another scholar of the time, Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Muʿtazilī (d. 317/929), said about al-Junayd's circle, "I saw a teacher in Baghdad whose name was al-Junayd b. Muḥammad. I've never seen anything like him. Writers used to sit in his circle to learn his style, philosophers for the subtleties of his thought, poets for his sheer poetry of expression, and theologians for his indications [about divine unity], but his words seem very distant from the understanding of the whole lot of them." Despite his power over words, he reasserted in many places, "All that is spoken is assumption," and, "Whoever knows God loses his tongue."

## Imam al-Junayd's Tribulations

Imam al-Sarrāj al-Ţūsī (d. 378/988) in his book al-Luma' says, "Despite all of his knowledge, depth, understanding, his constant practice of litanies and devotional prayers, and the high esteem in which he was held by the people of his time, al-Junayd suffered being accused of disbelief and heresy many times." Sadly, some of this involved other Sufis attacking al-Junayd out of envy. One notorious event occurred in the '60s of the 3rd/9th century during the days of the Caliph al-Muwaffaq (d. 278/891). Ghulām al-Khalīl (d. 275/888) a staunch jurist and Sufi attacked all of the Sufis of Baghdad who were speaking of divine love. Ghulām al-Khalīl first attacked Abū al-Husayn al-Nūrī (d. 295/907). Al-Khalīl told the Caliph that there is a man in Baghdad, Abū al-Husayn al-Nūrī, whose blood is permissible and that he himself would take the responsibility for the blood of the man he was condemning. Al-Khalīl said that the Caliph said, "I heard him, myself, say, 'I yearn for God and God yearns for me." So the Caliph asked al-Nūrī who replied, "I heard God say, 'God loves them and they love God. [Qur'an 5:54]' And yearning is just a type of love. The only difference is that one yearning is not present with his lover and one who loves is." The Caliph began to cry and told him he was free to go. While these attacks did not affect al-Junayd, one incident, which initially had nothing to do with him, almost cost him his life. Samnūn al-Ṣūfī (d. 297/910), who was also known as Samnūn al-Muhibb, had a female student who fell in love with him. He was known to be exceedingly handsome, had a beautiful voice, and was very eloquent. When he discovered that his student began to lust after him, he prohibited her from attending his gatherings. She then went to al-Junayd and asked him, "What do you say about a man who was my path to God and I lost God and the man remained?" Al-Junayd understood her meaning and only responded, "God is enough for us, and He is the best of protectors." The woman asked Samnūn to marry her, but he refused. Angered, when she found out that Ghulām Khalīl was waging a campaign against them, she went to him and said, "Those Sufis [so-and-so and so-and-so]," making mention of a number of them, "gather with me every night doing things that are prohibited." Ghulām took this information to the caliph and testified against them himself saying that their blood was his responsibility. The caliph ordered that they be executed, and had it not been for the intervention of al-Nūrī and his explanation to the authorities sent to implement the judgment, they may have been killed. Among those accused were al-Junayd, al-Shiblī (d. 334/946), Samnūn, Abū Hamzah, al-Shahhām (d. 267/880), and al-Raqqām. The trials of the scholars are many, but very often they are the tragic result of the envy of others or malice of the worldlings.

### Marriage and Livelihood

Imam al-Junayd was married but little is known about his family. He did say, "One needs marriage just as one needs food." Once al-Junayd was sitting with his wife at home, and his student al-Shiblī entered in a strong spiritual state of ecstasy. His wife was about to get up to leave the room, but al-Junayd said, "Sit down; al-Shiblī does not even know you are here." Later, when al-Shiblī's state changed, and he began to weep, al-Junayd indicated to his wife to leave the room.

We know that far from being apart from the world, al-Junayd was a successful silk merchant in Baghdad. He had a shop he would frequent daily and behind the front showroom was a small room wherein he would pray on average four-hundred prostrations throughout the day. The other area of worship he was devoted to was fasting. He believed that hunger was a powerful means to drawing closer to God and fasting helped one achieve that end. He said, *"One of you gets up to pray, but has placed between himself and God a large basket of food and yet still hopes to find the pleasure of intimate petition and understand his Lord's words!"* Another time he said, *"We did not take Sufism from hearsay and chit chat, but rather from hunger and detachment from the material world."* He also said, *"Fasting is half of our path."* 

Fasting is a foundational aspect of early Sufism. Abū Madyan al-Ghawth (d. 593/1197), the great Andalusian Sufi scholar, whose path is the foundation of the Bā 'Alawī tradition of Yemen, also placed great emphasis on fasting and the benefits of hunger. Although fasting was an integral part of his practice, if he happened to come across his companions and they offered him food, he would join in and break his fast because he considered the blessing of good company to be equal to fasting. Al-Suhrawardī (d. 632/1234) records him as saying, *"The help that one gains from his brothers' company is not less than what he gains from fasting.*" He performed hajj only once in his life to fulfill the obligation. Other than his trip to Mecca, he is known to have rarely ventured out of Baghdad during his entire life.

## **Al-Junayd's Students**

One of the immense blessings that Imam al-Junayd enjoyed in his life was great teachers and impressive students. Many extraordinary scholars of the past faded into obscurity due to the lack of proficient students who could codify their work and disseminate their teachings to ensure their perpetuity. Imam al-Junayd's most accomplished student among the masters of exoteric law was Ibn Surayj, the aforementioned Shāfʿī jurist. He is one of the most important early jurists in the school. Al-Subkī mentions it was said that, *"During the third century, three men stood out in different spheres: Ibn Surayj in law, al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936) in theology, and al-Nasāʿī (d. 303/916) in hadith."* Ibn Surayj was also one of the first to truly open up critical thought in law and engage people in legal dialectic to arrive at the truth during *ijtihād*.

Another of his major students was the hadith scholar, jurist, and Sufi, Abū Saʿīd Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ziyād b. Bishr b. al-ʿArabī (d. 341/952). Born in Basra, he went to Baghdad and studied under al-Junayd. He was already an accomplished scholar of *hadith*, studying under the redoubtable *hadith* master, Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/888), and a key transmitter of his book, when he came to al-Junayd. He later migrated to Mecca and became Shaykh al-Ḥaram, or the leading teacher in the sacred precinct and taught hadith for over thirty years.

Many great scholars came to Mecca for pilgrimage and invariably studied or met with another of Imam al-Junayd's students, Shaykh Abū Tālib al-Makkī (d. 386/998), who states in his book listing the mystics and their spiritual states: *"The last of these mystics was al-Junayd, and no one after him is worth mentioning."* In another section he says, *"When our Shaykh Abū Saʿīd b. al-ʿArabī wrote his book Tabaqāt al-nussāk, he described the first man who taught this knowledge and the others who came after him, men of Basra, Syrians, and Khurasanis, and said that the last to come was the Baghdad School.... The last person to teach Sufism was al-Junayd; he had vision and truth and expression, and we hesitate to mention anyone after him."* Without a doubt, this well-versed scholar of hadith and master of the Baghdādī school of Sufism is probably a major source of the diffusion of Imam al-Junayd's thought throughout the Muslim world at such an early stage of development.

Another scholar of great merit is Abū Muḥammad Jaʿfar b. Nuṣayr b. al-Qāsim b. al-Khawwāş al-Baghdādī al-Khuldī (d. 348/959). He started his studies of hadith and gained some mastery of the subject before becoming a student of al-Junayd. He is the first to apply the methodology of *hadith* collection and verification to the statements of the Sufi masters. He collected these statements in his book Ḥikāyāt al-awliyā'. This book, coupled with Abū Saʿīd's Kitāb al-nussāk, were held in high regard and read widely. They have been lost to us, but much of their contents is contained in other books such as Qūt al-qulūb by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī. An important student of al-Khuldī was Abū Naṣr b. ʿAlī al-Sarrāj al-Ṭūṣī. He wrote the well-known book al-Lumaʿ, which is still a source of much of what we know about Imam al-Junayd.

Another extremely important student is Imam Abū Bakr b. Dalaf b. Jaḥdar al-Shiblī. He was born in Samurai, Iraq. His father was a chamberlain for the Caliph al-Muwaffaq, and his maternal uncle was the chief governor in Alexandria. He was highly placed politically. He studied *hadith* and was a narrator himself. He mastered the variant Iraqi school of Imam Mālik b. Anas, and his opinion was highly regarded. Then he began studying Sufism with Khayr al-Nassāj (d. 487/1094) who suggested he study with the master al-Junayd. Al-Shiblī appears to have gone through several difficult trials during his training with al-Junayd and had to be constrained due to profound spiritual states that he could not control. He is also known for some ecstatic statements. Al-Junayd rebuked al-Shiblī on several occasions for his outbursts and preferred sobriety in one's outward state as congruous with the Sunnah of the Prophet, peace be upon him.

## **Al-Junayd's Teaching**

Quintessentially, Imam al-Junayd's teaching centers around the realization of monotheism (tawhīd) in one's experiential reality, as opposed to simply one of understanding as in creed. In essence, his teaching overlaps with that of the path of Ibn 'Ashir specifically, which is the Shādhilī school. In one of his letters, Imam al-Junayd sums up the state of the Sufi: "In this state of absolute purity he has lost his personal attributes; by this loss he is wholly present [in God]. By being wholly present in God, he is wholly lost to himself, absent and present at the same time. He is where he is now, and he is not where he is." He latter adds in the same letter, "Then, after he has not been, he is where he had been. He is himself, after he has not been really himself. He is present in himself and in God, after having been present in God and absent in himself. This is because he has left intoxication of God's overwhelming power (ghalabah), and come to clarity of sobriety (sahw), and contemplation is once more restored to him so that he can put everything in its right place and assess it correctly." His emphasis on spiritual sobriety is important, as he ultimately views his path as nothing other than an expression of the internal path that the Qur'an and the Sunnah lay down as best exemplified in the Prophet, peace be upon him, himself. This dimension of his teaching is a large reason for its widespread acceptance across the Islamic world over the centuries. His understanding of the oneness of God (tawhīd) is consistent with orthodox articulations of Sunni theology and is best expressed in his statement below:

Tawhīd is the separation of the Uncreated from creation (*ifrād al-qadīm 'an al-muhdath*).

That means:

- 1) To separate the eternal essence from the originated essence;
  - i.e. to fix or hold fast to this essence of God and to disprove or reject all others.
- 2) To separate the attributes contained therein from all other attributes;i.e. to fix or hold fast to the attributes of God and to disprove or refute all others.
- 3) To separate actions; i.e. to separate the actions of God and to disprove and refute all others.

Al-Junayd's spiritual philosophy entails the spiritual aspirant doing this experientially and not theoretically. This is the realization of *tawhīd* and, in his estimation, is the true meaning of the verse, *"Know that there is no god but God"* (47:19). In his chapter on *tawhīd*, Imam al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1074) says,

Al-Junayd was asked, "What is *tawhīd*?" and he answered, "To consider the One truly One through the realizations of His oneness and the perfection of His uniqueness—that He is the One, neither born nor begotten, by negating any opposites, peers, or likenesses, without having any anthropomorphism, explanations, conceptions, images—knowing that nothing is like Him, yet He hears and sees.... If the intellects of the intelligent arrive at true tawhīd, the end is utter bewilderment."

This *tawhīd* in Imam al-Junayd's understanding is based upon his theory of the covenant (mīthāq) and the doctrine of annihilation of the self in the divine presence (*fanā*'). Ibn 'Åshir covers the first in his section on Sufism in the presentation of piety (*taqwā*), its four types, and what is demanded of the individual who has a primordial covenant that he entered into with God before this world began. The prophets are only reminders, and obedience to their laws is expected of the people; they must consciously accept this covenant. The second part, annihilation of the self in the divine presence (*fanā*'), requires the spiritual disciple to be in the company of one who has arrived and is in the divine presence in order for him to attain that state or die trying.

## Al-Junayd's Final Words and Death

According to Ibn <sup>c</sup>Aṭā' al-<sup>c</sup>Ādamī (d. 309/921), Imam al-Junayd had just finished his litany when he turned to greet him, then faced the *qiblah*, and took his last breath. Abū Bakr al-<sup>c</sup>Aṭṭār (d. 354/965) visited him also right before he died and when he saw how swollen he was he said, "What is this swelling, Abū al-Qāsim?" Al-Junayd replied, "*Blessings from my Lord. God is Great.*" His two requests were as follows: He asked his companions to bury his written works as he did not want to meet his Lord with anything attributed to him while the *hadith* of the Prophet, peace be upon him, was among the Muslims. The second request was that his friends celebrate his death by having a feast of food after they finish burying him. Among the meanings that can be derived from this second request is that he was concerned that in his absence they would possibly stop meeting and so he indicated the great import of brothers gathering for the sake of God. As for the feast, it is quite unusual for a man who deemed hunger so important to spiritual development, but a feast is a time of joy and festivity, and he was indicating they should see his death as positive and not negative, something that should be celebrated and not lamented.

Imam al-Junayd died in Shawwāl, in the last hour of Friday before sunset, in the year 297/910. He was buried in al-Shūnīziyyāh next to his uncle Sarī al-Saqaţī. His tomb is still visited by countless Muslims today.

He was an accomplished jurisprudent in the school of Abū Thawr, but he is most famous for his mastery of the spiritual sciences. Imām al-Qushayrī, the author of the famous al-Risālah, declared him the master and imam of all Sufis. Imām al-Junayd's sayings and aphorisms are widely quoted, and one would be hard pressed to find a book on spiritual excellence without finding him referenced. Among his sayings are the following:

#### All doors are closed except for one who follows in the footsteps of the Messenger of God.

Whoever has not mastered the Qur'an and studied the prophetic traditions at the hands of its masters is not to be followed in this matter [the spiritual sciences].

There are men who have walked on water because of their certitude and others who have died of thirst who were stronger in their certitude.

The key to every door and every treasured knowledge is exerting effort.

If a sincere person were to turn to God for one million years and then turn away from Him for an instant, then that which has been lost is greater than that which had been gained.

#### Chivalry is forbearance of the mistakes of others.

Al-Junayd's religious practice was impeccable. In fact, even those who found fault with some Sufi practices acknowledged that al-Junayd was a model Sufi and beyond reproach. When al-Junayd was told that some of the so-called Sufis claimed that they reached a level of spiritual excellence such that prayer is no longer incumbent upon them, he stated, *"Yes, but what they have reached is hell-fire."* 

Al-Junayd sought his livelihood as a silk merchant, where he would offer 400 units  $(rak^c \bar{a}t)$  of prayer daily while in his shop. He remained steadfast in his devotions until his death, whereupon he was in its throes, still prostrating, still weeping, until his soul returned to its Creator.

کت**ا بُ مُبَا دِیءِ التَّصَوُّفْ** من متن المرشد المعين لسيدي عبد الواحد المعروف بابن عاشر

# The Book of the Basic Principles of Sufism and that which Guides to Realization

From the Text 'The Helping Guide' by 'Abd al-Wahid, aka Ibn 'Ashir

تَجِبُ فَوْرًا مُطلقًا وَهِيَ النَّدَ م

وتَوْبَةُ منْ كُلِّ ذَنْبٍ يُجْتَرَ مَ

Repentance from every sin committed Is necessary immediately and resolutely. It is [defined as] a sense of remorse.

بِشَرْطِ الإقلاعِ وَنَفْيِ الإصرارُ وَلَيْتَلاَفَ مُمْكِنًا ذَا استغفارُ

[Its acceptance] is contingent upon abandoning [the sin], refusing to persist in it,

And rectifying [the effects of it] if possible [if the sin violated the rights of others]. That is atonement.

وَحاصِلُ التَّقُوى اجتنابُ وامتثالُ في ظاهِرٍ وباطنٍ بِذَا تُنالُ

The essence of piety is to avoid [Divine displeasure] and obey [the Divine Will],

Both inwardly and outwardly. In this manner, it is obtained.

وهيَ للسّالِكِ سُبْلُ الْمَنْفَعَهُ فجأءت الأقسامُ حقًا أرْبَعَه ْ

Thus, its categories are indeed four in number: [inward and outward, fulfilling and avoiding];

And these, for the wayfarer, are the pathways of benefit.

يغُضُّ عَيْنَيْهِ عَنِ الْمَحارِمِ لَيُكُفُّ سَمْعَهُ عَنِ الْمَآثِرِ

He lowers his gaze from what is prohibited; And keeps his hearing from [listening to] sinful matters:

كَغيبَةٍ نَميمَةٍ زورٍكَذِبْ لسانُهُ أَحْرَى بِتَرْكِ مَا جُلِبْ

Such as backbiting, malicious slander, false testimony and lying; [Obviously,] his own tongue should avoid any of them, first and foremost;



يَتَرُكُ ما شُبِّهَ با هُتِمَا مِ

يحْفَظُ بَطْنَهُ مِنَ الحرامِ

He guards his stomach from all that is prohibited, And assiduously abandons what is doubtful;

في الْبَطْشِ والسَّعْيِ لِمَمْنوعٍ يُريدُ يَحْفَظُ فَرْجَهُ وَيَتَّقِى الشَّهِيدُ

He guards his genitals;

he is conscientiously aware of the One Who witnesses all things, In matters of aggression or when pursuing anything forbidden that he might desire;

ما اللهُ فيهِنَّ بِهِ قَدْ حَكَمَا وَيُوقِفُ الأمو رَحتَّى يَعْلَمَا

He abstains from [pursuing] all matters until he ascertains What God has judged about their [legal status];



وَحَسَدٍ عُجْبٍ وَكُلِّ دَاءِ يُطهِّرُ الْقَلْبَ مِنَ الرِّيَاءِ

He purifies his heart from ostentatious piety, [Malicious] envy, vanity, and all [other] diseases [of the heart].

وَاعْلَمُ بِأَنَّ أَصْلَ ذِي الآفَاتِ حُبُّ الرِّياسَةِ وَطرْحُ الآتي

Know well that the origin of [all of] these ills Is love of leadership and procrastination.

رَأْسُ الخَطَايا هُوَحُبُّ الْعَاجِلَة لَيْسَ الدَّوَا إِلاَّ فِي الإَضْطِرارِ لَهُ

The fountainhead of all misdeeds is love of the fleeting world, Which has no cure other than fleeing to God;

يَصْحَبُ شَيْخًا عَارِفَ الْمَسَالِكُ فَي عَقِيهُ فِي طريقِهِ الْمَهَالِكُ

He keeps company with a teacher who knows [well] the pathways [to God], One who protects him along his path from causes of destruction;

وَيُوصِلُ الْعَبْدَ إلى مَوْلا هُ يُذْكِرُهُ اللَّهَ إِذَا رَآهُ

Who reminds him of God when he sees him, And who is able to take the servant to his Master.

يُحَاسِبُ النَّفْسَ عَلَى الأنفاسِ وَيَزِنُ الْخَاطِرَ بِالقُسْطَاسِ

He appraises his soul with every breath And he weighs his suggestive thoughts with the most precise scale [of the shariah];

وَيَحْفَظُ الْمَفْروضَ رَأْسَ الْمالِ وَالنَّفْلُ رِجُحُهُ بِهِ يُوَالِي

He guards the obligatory, which is his capital. His profits [however] are his extra acts by which he enters into the protection of the Divine;

وَالْعَوْنُ فِي جَمِيعِ ذَا بِرَبِّهِ وَيُكْثِرُ الذِّكْرَ بِصَفُو لُبِّهِ

He constantly remembers [God] with an unperturbed heart; [And knows that] the assistance in all of this is from his Lord;

يُجاهِدُ النَّفْسَ لِرَبِّ الْعالَمينُ وَيَتَحَلَّى بِمَقَاماتِ الْيَقِينُ

He struggles against [the negative tendencies] of his soul for the Lord of the worlds. [Through this continued struggle,] he is adorned with the stations of certainty:



زُهْدٌ تَوَكَّلُ رضًا مُحَبَّه خَوْفٌ رَجَا شُكْرٌ وَصبرٌ تَوْبَه

Fear, hope, gratitude, patience, repentance, Detachment, complete trust, contentment, and [finally,] love;

He is sincere in his dealings with the One Who witnesses over him, And he is content with whatever the Divine has apportioned for him.

يَصِيرُ عِنْدَ ذَاكَ عَارِفًا بِهِ حُرًّا وَغَيْرُهُ خَلاَ مِنْ قَلْبِهِ

By all of that, he becomes intimately acquainted with God. [He is truly] free [from serving temporal things] because everything but [God] has been emptied from his heart.

For this, the Divine has loved and chosen him For the presence of the Holy One, and made him one of the elect.

ذَا القَدْ رُنْظُمًا لاَ يَفِي بِالغَايَهُ وَفِي الَّذِي ذَكَرْتُهُ كِفَايَهُ

[One should know that] this amount of verse is by no means exhaustive. However, in what I have mentioned is enough [to serve as a foundation].



In the name of Allah, Most Merciful and Compassionate

#### **SESSION 1**

Introduction & The Journey Of Ten Thousand Miles Begins With One Step: Tawbah

Learning to Worship Allāh As If You See Him: Taqwā

#### **SESSION 2**

Guarding the Pathways to the Heart: Eyes, Ears and Tongue

Taking Control of the Carnal Desires of the Stomach

Taking Control of Sexual Desires

#### **SESSION 3**

Islām: Levels of Submission to the Divine

Cancers of the Heart: Ostentation and Jealousy

Cancers of the Heart: Egomania and Love of Leadership

#### **SESSION 4**

The Corner Stone of Understanding: Preference for the  $\bar{A}khirah$ 

Finding and Properly Benefitting From Guidance on One's Spiritual Path

Vehicles of the of Ascent: Furū and Nawāfil
#### **SESSION 5**

Tools of the Spiritual Trade: Struggling with the Nafs

Tools of the Spiritual Trade: Fear and Hope

Tools of the Spiritual Trade: Trusting in Allāh and Doing Without

#### **SESSION 6**

Love: The Life of the Heart

What Differentiates the Saints From the Common People?: Ikhlās

# KEY TO THE MATHNAWI

# RHYMING COUPLETS OF PROFOUND SPIRITUAL MEANING Masnvil Ma'navi

By Mawlana Jalal ad-Din ar-Rumi

Translated and Taught by Ustadh Feraidoon Mojadedi





مە نى نامە

> بشنواز نیچون حکایت یکند ازجدایی هاشکایت یکند

کزنیستان تامراببریدهاند ازنفیرممردوزن نالیدهاند

سینه خواهم شرحه شرحه ازفراق تابگویم شرح درداشتیاق

هرکسیکودورماندازاصلخویش بازجویدروزگاروصلخویش

من به هرجمعیتی نالان شد م جفت بد حالان و خو شحالان شد م

> هرکسیازظن خود شدیارمن ازدورن من نجست اسرارمن

سرمن ازناله ی من د ورنیست لیک چشم وگو ش را آن نورنیست

تن زجان و جان زتن مستورنیست لیک کس را دید جان د ستورنیست

آتشاستاین بانگ نای ونیست باد هرکه این آتش ندارد نیست باد

آتشعشقستکاندرنیفتاد جوششعشقاستکاندریفتاد

> نىحرىف ھركەاز يارى بريد پردەھايش پردەھاى مادريد

ھمچونىزھرىوترياقىكەديد؟ ھمچونىدمسازومشتاقىكەديد؟


نیحدیثراہپرخون میکند قصہ ہای عشق مجنون میکند

محرم این هو شجز بیهو ش نیست مرزبان رامشتریجزگو ش نیست

> درغمماروزهابیگاهشد روزهاباسوزهاهمراهشد

روزهاگررفتگو: روباک نیست توبمان ای آنکه چون تو پاک نیست

هرکه جزماهی زآبش سیرشد هرکه بی روزیست روزش دیرشد

درنيابد حال پخته هيچ خام پس سخن کوتاه بايد والسلام

بندبگسل با ش آزادا ی پسر چند با شی بند سیم و بند ز ر

گربریزیبحررادرکوزهای چندگنجدقسمت یک روزهای

> کوزه چشم حریصان پرنشد تاصد ف قانع نشد پرد'رنشد

هرکه راجامه زعشقی چاک شد اوزحرص وعیب کلی پاک شد

شادباش ای عشق خوش سود ای ما ای طبیب جمله علتهای ما

> ای د وای نخوت و ناموس ما ای توافلاطون و جالینوس ما

جسمخاک ازعشق برافلاک شد کوه د ر رقص اَمد و چالاک شد

عشق جان طور آمد عاشقا طورمست وخرمو سی صاعقا

بالب د مسازخودگرجفتمی همچونی من گفتنیها گفتمی

هرکه اوازهم زبانی شد جد ا بی زبان شدگرچه دارد صد نوا

چونکه گل رفت وگلستان د رگذ شت نشنوی زان پس ز بلبل سرگذ شت

جمله معشوقست و عاشق پرده ای زنده معشوقست و عاشق مرده ای

چون نباشد عشق راپر وای او او چومرغی ماند بی پر وای او

من چگونه هوش دارم پیش و پس چون نباشد نور یارم پیش و پس

عشق خواهد کین سخن بیرون بود آینه غمازنبود چون بود

آینت دانی چرا غمازنیست زانکه زنگاراز رخش ممتازنیست




# INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC

# A COURSE BASED ON THE "ISAGOGE"

A Primer in Classical Logic

By Imam Athir al-Din al-Abhari

Translation and Notes by Faraz A. Khan Taught by Shaykh Hamza Yusuf



ب التدالر من الرحيم

# The Ten Foundations of the Art of Logic (المَبَادِئُ العَشَرَةُ لِعِلْمِ المَنْطِقِ)

العلّامة محمد بن علي الصبّان (d. 1207 AH/1792 CE)

الحَــــدُّ وَالمَــوْضُوعُ ثُـمَّ الشَّمَــرَه	*	إِنَّ مَبَادِي كُلِّ فَسِنٍّ عَشَرَه
وَالإسْمُ الإسْتِمْدَادُ حُكْمُ الشَّارِعْ	*	وَفَضْـــــلَهُ وَنِســــبَةٌ وَالــــواضِعْ
وَمَنْ دَرَى الجَمِيعَ حَازَ الشَّرَفَـا	*	مَسَائِلٌ وَالبَعْضُ بِالبَعْضِ اكْتَفَــى

Each science contains these ten elements The essence, its subject and benefits

Its virtue, relations, and source Its name, whence it draws, legal force

Add topics, and all is contained With mastery much honor is gained.

## 1. Definition (الحَدّ)

- a) Logic may be defined as "the art which directs the very act of reason, that which enables us to advance with order, ease, and correctness in the act of reason itself." (Jacques Maritain, d. 1973)
- b) As a science, it regulates the investigation of concepts and propositions in ways that enable one to arrive at a previously unknown proposition. Another definition is "the science that enables us to conclude from something that is known something that was previously unknown." (al-Ṭālib ibn al-Ḥājj al-Fāsī, d. 1273/1856)
- c) "Logic may be defined as *the science that directs our mental operations* so that they proceed with order, facility, and consistency toward the attainment of truth. The mental operations referred to in this definition are the three basic acts of the intellect, namely, conception (or simple apprehension), judgment, and reasoning." (Robert J. Kreyche)

# 2. Name (الاسم)

In most schools today, what was formerly known as Logic is now called "critical thinking." In Arabic, Logic is known as *manțiq* because it contains three meanings: the ability to speak, the ability to comprehend universals, and the power of comprehension. Arabs chose this word (منطق) because Logic strengthens the first, enables the second to be more accurate, and endows perfection on the third. Imam al-Ghazālī called it "the touchstone of knowledge" (معيار العلوم) and also the "Criterion of knowledge" (معيار العلوم). It is also called "the key to knowledge" (معيار العلوم) and "the balance" (معيار العلوم) because the soundness of speech is measured by it; another name given to it is the "upright scale" based upon this Qur'anic verse (26:182): (وَزِنُواْ بِٱلْقِسْطَاسِ ٱلْمُسْتَقِيمَ). Aristotle referred to it as Analytics (Prior and Posterior). It is also divided into Major (Material) and Minor (Formal) Logic, depending upon the subject matter. Formal Logic covers the validity or invalidity of the syllogism's *form* and structure, while Material Logic covers the actual *content* of the syllogism.

The late Nineteenth Century witnessed the emergence of Symbolic or Mathematical Logic that over time eclipsed the two-thousand-year reign of traditional Logic. Today, Symbolic Logic dominates and is necessary in computer programming and, while useful, it can never replace traditional Logic which is still the basis of our legal system.

# (الموضوع) 3. Subject

The subject of Logic covers the three operations of the mind: conceptualization, judgment, and reasoning through argumentation or demonstration.

## 4. Benefit (الثمرة)

According to Imam al-Ghazālī (d. 504/1111), Logic is "an introduction to all knowledge, and the one who has not mastered it cannot be relied upon for his knowledge at all." Its greatest benefit derives from the clarity of thought and sound reasoning skills it engenders in one trained in its art coupled with more effective oral and written communication.

## 5. Topics (المسائل)

The topics of Minor or Formal Logic consist of Simple Apprehensions, Concepts, Terms, Definitions, Divisions, Judgments, Propositions, and their varieties, such as Simple and Compound, Affirmative and Negative, Categorical, Hypothetical, and Modal, Opposition and Conversion, Reasoning, the Syllogism and its Divisions, and finally Induction.

Material or Major Logic deals with the contents of Syllogisms and involves Categories, the Five Predicables, the Five Arts, Logical Fallacies, and Topics. Related subjects are Dialectic, Rhetoric, Psychology, Cosmology, and Criticism.

## 6. Sources (الاستمداد)

Logic does not derive its sources from any other science. It is the singular introductory science, and its sources are observation and intuition. Logic's basic tools are intuited concepts and the concomitant propositions that stem from them. Concepts involve the mind's abstraction of universals from particulars, which enables definition. Propositions involve composing or separating concepts in a subject/predicate form upon which judgment is based.

These two operations of the mind are how we reason deductively or inductively in the third act of the mind: argument or demonstration. These three mental operations are the sources of Logic, which is essentially an analytical inquiry into these "acts of the mind," which enable us to reason soundly and avoid the pitfalls common to an untrained mind. Its sources and foundations, such as the Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction, and the Excluded Middle are rooted in self-evident truths – that is, any truth the opposite of which is impossible to conceive.

# (الواضع) 7. Founder

Reasoning is elemental to the human condition, and we are all gifted naturally with powers of reason that govern our actions. According to Muslim sources, Logic as a codified science was first developed by the ancients and remained latent, some claim hidden, until Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) recorded its rules, defined its terms, and revealed its secrets. Aristotle's six books, known collectively as *The Organon*, are considered the first books on Logic and thus, he is arguably the founder and first teacher of Logic.

In the Islamic tradition, al-Farābī (d. 350/961), who is considered the second teacher, introduced Logic into Islamic civilization. Later, Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) attempted to provide for the Muslim world what Aristotle did for the Hellenic civilization: an encyclopedic work covering logic, natural science, mathematics (the quadrivium), and metaphysics. The logic section of his book, *The Healing (al-Shifā')*, became the basis for Arabic Logic, which differs from Aristotelian Logic in some areas. After mastering Ibn Sīnā's work, Imam al-Ghazālī removed what he deemed any objectionable aspects of it and wrote five works of varying levels of difficulty for students of knowledge. All five are still in use.

### 8. Relationship to Other Sciences (نسبة)

Its relation to other sciences is that of a universal to a particular, as all other sciences are comprised of concepts, propositions, and arguments. As such, Logic is *sui generis*, although categorized among the arts known in the West as "Liberal" and in the Muslim world as "instrumental" (من علوم الآلة).

## 9. Virtue and Rank (فضله، شرفه، رتبته)

Given its universal benefit vis-á-vis other sciences, Logic is an overarching science. Its subject matter (concepts, propositions, and arguments) is integral to every other science. Hence, scholars have always considered it a necessary propaedeutic subject and a means to sound knowledge. While as ends other sciences surpass Logic in rank, its supreme virtue is as a means that insures intellectual rigor in the pursuit of knowledge.

# 10. Legal Category (حكم الشارع)

The opinions of scholars can be categorized as those who consider the study of Logic 1) recommended, 2) permitted, 3) a collective obligation, or 4) prohibited.

The first opinion, recommended, is that of most theologians, legal theorists, and many of the jurists, including al-Ghazālī (according to one narration), Ibn 'Arafah (d. 803/1400), al-Ubbī (d. 827/1423), and al-Sanūsī (d. 892/1486), and this is the soundest opinion according to most scholars.

The second opinion is that Logic is permissible for those whose intellect is sound, and who have knowledge of the Book and the Sunnah. This is the opinion of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355).

The third opinion is that it is an obligation. This is the opinion of al-Qutub al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1364) mentioned by al-Ajhūrī (d. 957/1550) and al-Zarqānī (d. 1122/1710) in the chapter on jihad in their commentaries on *al-Mukhtaṣar*.

Some argued that the obligation was individual because sound knowledge of God relies upon sound reasoning, and others said it was collective because the religion is made safe by protecting its beliefs, and that has to be done through the use of reason. This is the opinion of Imam al-Yūsī (d. 1060/1650) and of Imam al-Ghazālī in his *Iḥyā*'.

The fourth opinion, held by such formidable scholars as Ibn Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245), al-Nawawī (d. 676/1300), al-Ṣuyūṭī (d. 911/1505), and Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1327), is that preoccupation with Logic is prohibited.

However, our scholars concluded that what they were actually prohibiting was not Logic per se, but rather Philosophical Logic, specifically the metaphysical foundations of it and the false conclusions derived from them. On the contrary, Logic is none other than the "grammar of thought," and recognizing its great utility in the arsenal of knowledge, our scholars codified it and purified it of any ungrounded epistemic speculations contained in Philosophical Logic. Furthermore, given that the cause of the prohibition was removed, the effect became null and void – the reason being that in a legal ruling, based upon scholastic opinion, a cause cannot be disassociated from an effect in its presence or in its absence (مالعلة تدور مع المعلول وجودا وعدما).







## **INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC**

قالَ الشَّيْخُ الْإِمَامُ أَفْضَلُ الْمَتَأَخِّرِينَ، قُدْوَةُ الحُكَمَاءِ الرَّاسِخِينَ أَثِيرُ الدِّيْنِ الْأَبْهَرِيُّ، طَيَّبَ اللَّهُ ثَرَاهُ، وَحَعَلَ الجَنَّةَ مَثْوَاهُ:بِسْمِ اللهِ الرَّحْمنِ الرَّحِيْمِ نَحْمَدُ اللهُ عَلَى تَوْفِيقِهِ وَنَسْأَلُهُ هِدَايَةَ طَرِيقِهِ وَنُصَلَّي عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَعَلَى عِتْرَتِهِ أَحْمَعِينَ، أَمَّا بَعْدُ. فَهذهِ رِسَالَةٌ فِي المَنْطِقِ أَوْرَدْنَا فِيهَا مَا يَجِبُ اسْتِحْضارُهُمَا لِمَنْ يَبْتَدِئُ فِي شَيءٍ مِنَ الْعُلُومِ مُسْتَعِينَا بِاللهِ إِنَّهُ مُفِيضُ الْحَيْرِ وَالجُوْدِ.

The Shaykh, Imām Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī, the best of later scholars and exemplar of firmly-rooted logicians (may Allāh make his resting place pleasant and make Paradise his abode) states:

In the Name of Allāh, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate. We praise Allāh [Most High] for His enablement of us to worship Him, and we ask Him for guidance on His path. We send blessings upon [our Master] Muḥammad ﷺ, and upon his family [Companions, and followers]—all of them.

To proceed. This, then, is a treatise in [the science of] logic; we have placed therein all of which must be immediately accessible in one's mind for one who begins to study any of the religious sciences. We do so while seeking help from Allāh [Most High], for verily He is the Giver of goodness and generous gifts.

1 Signification (*dalāla*) is of three types: (1) solely logical (*'aqliyya*), (2) natural (*tabī'iyya or 'ādiyya*), and (3) by formulation (*wad'iyya*). Each type can be nonverbal or verbal. The first type of signification refers to something signifying something else based on logic alone. Nonverbal examples include movement by volition signifying life; the movement of a hand signifying movement of a ring on its finger; or movement of a ship in the sea signifying movement of its passengers, based on its movement. A verbal example is a word indicating the person that said it, or the fact that he is alive. The second type of signification is not logical, but rather based on the "natural order" of things in creation, as Allāh Most High determines the creation to be, and is hence known empirically instead of logically. Nonverbal examples include medical signs and symptoms in a body, such as fever, vomiting or diarrhea, signifying physical illness; a reddish complexion of one's face signifying shyness; or heavy rain signifying a fertile season. A verbal example is the word "ouch" signifying feeling pain. The third type of signification, that by formulation, is based on how people have formulated, or laid out, things or concepts. Nonverbal examples are the meanings signified by traffic lights or traffic signs (such as a red light signifying "stop," or green light "go"); school bells signifying class times; or nodding one ||s head signifying agreement. Verbal signification by formulation deals with language (i.e., words laid out by humans, or the Divine, to signify meanings), and is the only type of signification that is dealt with in this science, logic (Ḥabannaka 26–7, Bājūrī 31). Hence, the present text begins with a discussion of it and its three subtypes, as delineated above.

#### Verbal Signification by Formulation (Dalāla Lafziyya Wadiyya)

A vocable (*lafz*) that signifies<sup>1</sup> [a meaning] by formulation indicates its entire meaning by complete accord (*muțābaqa*); a part of its meaning—if it has a part—by partial accord (*taḍammun*); and that which is inextricably bound to it in the mind by concomitance (*iltizām*).

اللَّفْظُ الدَّالُّ بالوَضْع يَدُلُّ عَلَى تَمَام مَا وُضِعَ لَهُ بالْمُطَابَقَةِ، وَ عَلَى جُزْئِهِ بالتَّضَمُّن إنْ كَانَ لَهُ جُزْءٌ، وَعَلَى مَا يُلاَزِمُهُ فِي الذِّهْنِ بِالإِلْتِزَامِ.

For example, [the vocable] "human" (*insān*) indicates [its entire meaning of] "a rational creature" (*hayawān nāțiq*) by complete accord;<sup>2</sup> one of them [i.e., either "rational" or "creature"] by partial accord;<sup>3</sup> and [the meaning] "receptive to knowledge and the skill of writing" by concomitance.<sup>4</sup>

#### Vocables and The Five Universals

ثُمَّ اللَّفْظُ إِمَّا مُفْرَدٌ وَهُوَ الَّذِي لاَ يُرَادُ بِالجُزْءِ مِنْهُ دِلاَلَةٌ عَلَى جُزْءِ المعْنَى كَالإِنْسَانِ، وَإِمَّا مُؤَلَّفٌ وَهُوَ الَّذِي لاَ يَكُونُ كَذلِكَ كَرامِي الْحِجَارَةِ.

A vocable (*laf*z) [that signifies meaning] is either singular (*mufrad*),<sup>5</sup> namely, that which a part of it does not designate a part of its meaning, like "human"; or [it is] composite (*mu'allaf*), namely, the opposite, such as "one who casts stones" ( $r\bar{a}m\bar{i}$  '*l*-<u>h</u> $ij\bar{a}ra$ ).

2 Any name of a species indicates a creature of that species by complete accord, such as "human," "lion," "bear," etc. A Qur'ānic example would be "cow" in the verse, "Verily, Allāh commands you to sacrifice a cow" (2:67), which by complete accord indicates that well-known animal. Hence, any member of that species would have sufficed in fulfilling the divine mandate; however, the Children of Israel made the matter more difficult for themselves by asking for specification, and so Allāh responded by making the matter more difficult for them (Habannaka 28).

3 For example, if one sees a distant figure and asks, "Is that a creature or an inanimate object?" not seeking any other information, and we respond, "It is a human," then "human" in our response is used to indicate the meaning "creature" by partial accord, as "creature" is part of the meaning of "human." Another example is if a physician tells his patient, "You need more vitamins in your diet, so eat more fruits and uncooked vegetables," whereby he informs the patient by partial accord that those foods naturally contain vitamins (Habannaka 29).

4 Concomitance refers to a quality customarily or logically associated with a word, yet not imbedded within its complete or partial meaning. For example, the meaning indicated by "human" is "rational creature," yet the qualities of being "receptive to knowledge" or "able to write" are customarily associated with a human of sound senses and faculties. So if one asks, for example, "Is that creature receptive to knowledge and able to write?" and we respond, "It is a human," then we have used "human" to indicate those two qualities, which it does by concomitance.

Another example is "an even number," which by concomitance indicates that it is divisible by two without a remainder, a quality logically associated with the term "even number."

The indication of meaning by concomitance is a powerful tool in rhetoric and, therefore, used very often in the Qur'ān, such as for example, "If you pardon, overlook and forgive, then verily Allāh is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful" (64:14). The response, "Then verily Allāh is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful" indicates by concomitance that "Allāh will forgive you and have mercy on you if you pardon, overlook and forgive"; this meaning is not explicitly stated in the verse, yet it is implied by Allāh's being All-Forgiving and Most Merciful, in that He would recompense those who pardon and forgive with His own mercy and forgiveness (Ḥabannaka 31).

5 The comprehension of a singular vocable is termed *taşawwur*, such as comprehending the person "Zaid." Every nominal sentence is composed of four *taşawwurs*: comprehension of the subject, comprehension of the predicate, comprehension of the ascription of the predicate to the subject, and the affirmation of that ascription; the latter *taşawwur* is termed *taşdīq*. For example, in the sentence "Zaid is standing," the three *taşawwurs* are "Zaid," "standing," and "the standing of Zaid," while the *taşdīq* is one's "affirmation of the standing of Zaid" (Bājūrī 28, Damanhūrī 6).

وَالْمُفْرَدُ إِمَّا كُلِّيٌّ وَهُوَ الَّذِي لاَ يَمْنَعُ نَفْسُ تَصَوُّر مَفْهُومِهِ عَنْ وُقُوْعِ الشَّركَةِ كَالإِنْسَانِ، وَإِمَّا جُزْئِيٌّ وَهُوَ الَّذِي يَمْنَعُ نَفْسُ تَصَوُّر مَفْهُومِهِ مِنْ ذَلِكَ كَزَيْدٍ.

A singular vocable is either a universal (*kullī*), namely, that which the very comprehension of its designated meaning does not prevent the occurrence of commonality therein [by instantiation], like "human"; or a particular (*juz'ī*),<sup>6</sup> namely, that which the very comprehension of its designated meaning does prevent that, like [the proper name] "Zaid."<sup>7</sup>

وَالْكُلِّيُّ إِمَّا ذَاتِيٌّ وَهُوَ الَّذِي يَدْخُلُ فِي حَقِيقَةِ جُزْئِيَّاتِهِ كَالحَيَوَانِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إلَى الْإِنْسَانِ وَالْفَرَس، وَإِمَّا عَرَضِيٌّ وَهُوَ الَّذِي يُخَالِفُهُ كَالضَّاحِكِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الْإِنْسَانِ.

A universal is either essential  $(dh\bar{a}t\bar{t})$ , namely, that which applies to the essence of its members, such as "creature" in relation to "human" or "horse"; or accidental (' $arad\bar{t}$ ), namely its contrast, such as "the one that laughs" in relation to "human."

An essential universal (dhātī) is either:

إِمَا مَقُولٌ فِي جَوَابٍ مَا هُوَ بِحَسَبٍ الشَّرِكَةِ الَحْضَةِ كَالحَيَوَانِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الْإِنْسَانِ وَالْفَرَس وَهُوَ الجِنْسُ، وَيُرْسَمُ بِأَنَّهُ كُلِّيٌّ مَقُولٌ عَلَى كَثِيرِينَ مُخْتَلِفِينَ بِالْحَقَائِقِ فِي جَوَابٍ مَا هُوَ.

• What is said in response to [the question] "What is it?", based solely on shared members, such as "creature" in relation to "human" or "horse"; this is termed the genus (*jins*). It can be described as "A universal that is said

Also, affirmation (taşdīq) is either "certain"  $(j\bar{a}zim)$  or "uncertain"  $(ghayrj\bar{a}zim)$ . The first is termed "knowledge" ('ilm) if it cannot be changed, such as affirmation of a mountain being made of rock or affirmation that a human normally moves by volition; and is termed "belief"  $(i'tiq\bar{a}d)$  if it can be changed. Belief is either "sound" (sahīh) if it corresponds to reality, like the belief in divine oneness, or "unsound"  $(f\bar{a}sid)$  if it does not, like the belief that the universe is preeternal. Uncertain affirmation is either "thought" or "opinion" (zann) if more likely to be true than its counterpart; "delusion" or "misgiving" (wahm) if less likely to be true; or "doubt" (shakk) if of equal likelihood (Akhdarī 25).

Additionally, that which leads to a comprehension (taşawwur) is termed definiens ( $qawl sh\bar{a}ri\hbar$ ), such as the definiens "rational creature," which leads to the comprehension of "human"; while that which leads to an affirmation ( $taşd\bar{i}q$ ) is termed syllogism ( $qiy\bar{a}s \ or \hbar ujja$ ) (see below as well), such as the syllogism "The universe is changing, and everything that changes is of temporal origination," which leads to the conclusion "The universe is of temporal origination" and its affirmation (Damanhūrī 6).

6 A universal (*kulli*) is a logical category; it can be applied to more than one singular entity, such as the words human, planet, or tree. A specific member of a category is termed a particular (*juz'i*), such as Zaid, Jupiter, or the tallest tree in a forest. A particular cannot be logically applied to more than one singular entity; the most common usage is with proper names. For example, the name "Khalid" is designated to represent only a particular individual; it cannot be logically applied to another person, no matter how similar the two individuals are, as the role of a proper name is to distinguish one singular entity from all others. This would apply even if the other person's name is also "Khalid," because in reality, there are two proper names, each designated for a different individual, even if the two names are the same word. Each person was named with his own individual name so as to be distinct and distinguished from other persons, and it is a tangential and unconsequential matter that their two names are identical; the primary purpose of naming was achieved (Ḥabannaka 34–5).

7 The terms universal (*kullī*) and particular (*juz'ī*) must be differentiated from terms that refer to an entire entity as a whole (*kull*), which allows for exceptions; a part of that whole (*juz'*); every member of a group (*kulliyya*), which normally does not allow for exceptions; or one or some members of a group (*juz'iyya*). An example of an entire entity as a whole (*kull*) is the statement, "The people of Azhar are scholars," since as a whole they are, yet there are exceptions as some of them are not. An example of a part of a whole (*juz'*) is the thread of a carpet. A statement dealing with every member of a group (*kulliyya*) is "Every human is capable of understanding." A statement dealing with some members of a group (*juz'iyya*) is "Some of the people of Azhar are scholars" (Damanhūrī 8). in response to 'What is it?' yet refers to many members that differ in their essential realities;"  $^{\mbox{\tiny 8}}$ 

وَإِمَّا مَقُولٌ فِي جَوَاب مَا هُوَ بِحَسَبِ الشَّرِكَةِ وَالْحُصُوصِيَّةِ مَعًا كَالْإِنْسَانِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى زَيْدٍ وَعَمْرٍو وَهُوَ النَّوْعُ، وَيُرْسَمُ بِأَنَّهُ كُلِّىٌّ مَقُولٌ عَلَى كَثِيرِينَ مُخْتَلِفِينَ بِالْعَدَدِ دُونَ الْحَقِيقَةِ فِي جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ.

• Or what is said in response to "What is it?", based on both shared members as well as specificity, such as "human" in relation to "Zaid" and "'Amr"; this is termed the species (*naw'*). It can be described as "A universal that is said in response to 'What is it?' and that refers to many members that differ in number, not in their essential reality;"<sup>9</sup>

وَإِمَّا غَيْرُ مَقُولٍ فِي جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ بَلْ مَقُولٌ فِي جَوَابِ أَيُّ شَيْءٍ هُوَ فِي ذَاتِهِ وَهُوَ الَّذِي يُمَيِّزُ الشَّيْءَ عمَّا يُشَارِكُهُ فِي الجِنْسِ كَالنَّاطِقِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الْإِنْسَانِ وَهُوَ الْفَصْلُ، وَيُرْسَمُ بِأَنَّهُ كَلِّيٌّ يُقَالُ عَلَى الشَّيْءِ فِي جَوَابِ أَيُّ شَيْءٍ هُوَ فِي ذَاتِهِ.

• Or not said in response to "What is it?" but rather said in response to "What thing is it, in its essence [i.e., essential reality]?" It is that [attribute] which [essentially] distinguishes a member from other members of its shared genus, such as "rational" in relation to "human"; this is termed the differentia (*faşl*). It can be described as "A universal that refers to something said in response to —What thing is it, in its essence?:<sup>no</sup>

8 For example, "creature" (hayawan) is a genus since it is a universal that encompasses every essential nature (mahiyya) shared between multiple members that differ in their realities. That is, "creature" includes the human, horse, ghazelle, and the rest of the animal kingdom, each animal differing from the rest in its own essential nature, since the complete essential nature of a human differs from that of a horse, which differs from that of a ghazelle, etc. However, their essential natures have a shared component, namely, that they are all "creatures." Each, therefore, can individually be called a "creature."

The question "What is it?" in the definition above is used to ask regarding the essential nature  $(m\bar{a}hiyya)$  of a thing, i.e., its essential components that make up its reality, such as "being a creature" and "being rational" with respect to the human. Attributes of a thing that are not essential are termed "accidental" or "accidents," meaning the thing can be logically conceived of without those traits, and still be what it is, regardless of whether those traits are inseparable or separable from that thing. For the human, these would include walking or laughing, for example (Habannaka 39-40). That is, a human being can be logically conceived of without the qualities of walking or laughing, while still be considered a human being. However, a human cannot be logically conceived of without the qualities of being a creature or having the capacity to think rationally, while still being considered a human being.

Finally, there are three types of genus (*jins*): proximate (*qarīb*), intermediate (*wasaț*), and remote (*baʿīd*). From the perspective of the human, the proximate genus is "creature" (*ḥayawān*), an intermediate genus is "that which grows" (*nāmī*), and a remote genus is "body" (*jism*) (Damanhūrī 8). The remoteness of a genus, then, refers to its being broader; "creature" encompasses other animals along with the human; "that which grows" encompasses plants, for example, as they are not creatures but do grow; and "body" encompasses inanimate objects that do not grow.

9 The species (*naw*<sup>c</sup>), then, is a member under the genus (*jins*); for example, the human is one species under the genus "creature," the horse is another species under it, and the ghazelle is a third species under it. Each animal is a species under the genus "creature."

وَأَمَّا الْعَرَضِيُّ فَإِمَّا أَنْ يَمْتَنعَ انْفِكَاكُهُ عَنِ المَاهِيَّةِ وَهُوَ الْعَرَضُ اللَّازِمُ، أَوْ لا يَمْتَنعَ وَهُوَ الْعَرَضُ الْمُفَارِقُ.

As for an accidental universal (' $arad\bar{t}$ ), it is either that which cannot be separated from its essential reality, namely, the inseparable accident (' $arad l\bar{a}zim$ ); or that which can [be separated], namely, the separable accident ('arad mufariq).

Each of the two, then, is either specific to one essential reality, namely, the particular accident ( $kh\bar{a}ssa$ ), such as "one who can potentially laugh" in relation to "human." It can be described as "An accidental universal that refers to members of only one essential reality;"<sup>11</sup>

وَإِمَّا أَنْ يَعُمَّ حَقَائِقَ فَوْقَ وَاحِدَةٍ وَهُوَ الْعَرَضُ الْعَامُ كَالْتَنَفِّسِ بِالْقُوَّةِ وَبِالْفِعْلِ لِلإِنْسَانِ وَغَيْرِهِ مِنَ الحَيَوَانَاتِ، وَيُرسَمُ بِأَنَّهُ كُلِّيٌ يُقَالُ عَلَى مَا تَحْتَ حَقَائِقَ مُخْتَلِفَةٍ قَوْلاً عَرَضِيًّا.

Or general, encompassing multiple essential realities, not just one, namely, the common accident (*'araḍ 'āmm*), such as "one who can potentially breathe" or "who is actually breathing" in relation to "human" and other creatures [as well]. It can be described as "An accidental universal that refers to multiple differing essential realities."<sup>12</sup>

With respect to the discussion of types of genus, one can appreciate that "genus" and "species" are to some degree relative terms, since "creature" and "plant" for example are "species" relative to the genus "that which grows," yet each of the two species serves as a genus for each species below it. "Creature" is a genus for "human," "horse," "ghazelle," etc., and "plant" is a genus for each type of plant categorized therein (Habannaka 40).

10 The differentia serves to differentiate each species from other ones within the same genus; so "rational" is the differentia for "human," as by it the human is distinguished from all other animals under the genus "creature" (Habbanaka 40).

11 The particular accident is an accident, and hence not of the thing's essential reality, yet it is particular to it and therefore is not shared by any other species within the shared genus. For example, laughing is a particular accident of the human; it is not from the human's essential reality, as one can conceive of a human that cannot laugh, yet no other species under the genus "creature" has that trait, as no animal can laugh. Laughing, of course, emanates due to psychological wonder or enjoyment, and

does not merely refer to the resultant sound or facial expression; hence, apes do not laugh. Other examples of particular accidents of the human include being "receptive to knowledge and the skill of writing" (Ḥabannaka 41).

12 The common accident is an accident and hence not part of something's essential reality, yet is common in that other species within the shared genus might possess that trait. For example, walking is an accident of the human, as one can conceive of a human that cannot walk, yet it is a common accident as other animals under the genus "creature" can also walk (Habannaka 41).

These, then, make up the five universals: genus (*jins*), species (*naw*'), differentia (*faşl*), particular accident (*khaṣṣa*), and common accident (*'araḍ*). Together, they are deemed the foundations of comprehension (*mabādi' al-taṣawwurāt*), in that one starts with the five universals and uses them to arrive at the end points of comprehension (*maqāşid al-taṣawwurāt*), which is the definiens (*qawl shāriḥ*). Sound definiens then leads to sound comprehension (Damanhūrī 8-9).

#### Definiens (Qawl Shāriḥ)

A [formal] definition<sup>13</sup> is a statement that indicates the essential nature ( $m\bar{a}hiyya$ ) of something; it is composed of its proximate genus and its proximate differentia, such as "rational creature" in relation to "human." This is a complete definition ( $hadd t\bar{a}mm$ ).<sup>14</sup>

An incomplete definition ( $hadd n \bar{a} q i s$ ) is composed of a remote genus of something and its proximate differentia,<sup>15</sup> such as "rational body" in relation to "human."

A complete description (*rasm tāmm*) of something is composed of its proximate genus and its inseparable particular accidents, such as "laughing creature" when defining [i.e., describing] "human."<sup>16</sup>

13 This section is entitled "Definiens" (*qawl shārih*) and represents the aim of the five universals. In Arabic, this is also termed *mu'arrif*, literally, that which gives you knowledge, or mental conception, of what something is and how it is distinguished from other things, as that is the purpose of definiens. This section is of the utmost importance in the science of logic, as most logical fallacies occur due to incorrect or invalid definitions, and most arguments occur due to implicitly using different definitions, or misunderstanding them in the first place.

There are some basic guidelines or rules for proper definiens, in that if they are not met, its purpose will not be fulfilled.

The first central rule is that the definiens not be broader or narrower than what it seeks to define, nor differ from it altogether. An example of definiens that is too broad is to define a human as "a creature," as that causes the listener to envision things outside the scope of "human" in his resulting mental conception, such as horses, snakes, and eagles. An example of definiens that is too narrow is to define a creature as "a rational, sentient body that can move," as that causes the listener to envision nothing but the human, while other animals which are creatures remain excluded. An example of definiens that differs altogether is to define a stone as "a flowing substance that quenches someone's thirst," or to define a human as "a neighing creature." Rather, a proper definienss is an exact match of what is being defined, that is, inclusive (*jāmi* or *mun* akis) and restrictive (*māni* or *muțțarid*).

The second central rule is that the definiens be clearer than what is being defined, rather than more or equally obscure. One cannot, for example, define asad (well-known Arabic word for lion) to a non-Arab as *qaswara* (a more obscure, or equally obscure, word for lion).

A third central rule is that knowing the definiens not depend on knowing what is being defined, lest it lead to circular reasoning (*dawr*), such as defining knowledge as "perceiving something known," since "something known" is assuming understanding of "knowledge," which is what is being defined in the first place (Habannaka 59-61).

The above serve as the main rules; some other rules are that the definiens not be metaphorical, such as defining a scholar as an ocean that is gentle with people, unless there is something to indicate what exactly is meant, like defining him as an ocean that is gentle with people and that is precise in his explanation. Also, the definiens should not have a ruling, such as defining the ritual prayer as obligatory. Finally, a formal definition (*hadd*) should not have the word "or," while a description (*rasm*) may use "or" (Akhdarī 29, Bājūrī 45, Damanhūrī 9).

14 A formal definition (*hadd*, *pl. hudūd*) is composed only of essential universals, while a description (*rasm*, *pl. rusūm*) is composed of only accidental universals, or of the genus and accidental universals, but never with the differentia. The order of most to least ideal types of definitions is the same as presented in the text above, namely, complete definition, incomplete definition, complete description, and incomplete description (Habannaka 62–3).

The complete definition is most ideal as it is most inclusive and restrictive of all definitions, since it is composed of the proximate genus and the proximate differentia, such as "rational creature" to define "human." If a more remote genus is used, such

An incomplete description (*rasm nāqiş*) is composed of accidents, all of which being specific to one essential reality, like our statement when defining [i.e., describing] "human"—"He is one who walks on two feet; has flat nails, apparent skin, and an upright stature; and laughs by nature."<sup>17</sup>

#### Propositions (Qadaya)

الْقَضِيَّةُ قَوْلُ يَصِحُّ أَنْ يُقَالَ لِقَائِلهِ إِنَّهُ صَادِقٌ فِيهِ أَوْ كَاذِبٌ فِيهِ. وَهِيَ إِمَّا حَمْلِيَّهُ كَقَوْلِنَا زَيْدٌ كَاتِبٌ أَوْ زَيْدٌ لَيْسَ بِكَاتِبٍ، وَإِمَّا شَرِطِيَّةُ مُتَّصِلَةٌ كَقَوْلِنَا إِنْ كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةً فَالنَّهَارُ مَوْجُودٌ، وَإِمَّا شَرْطِيَّةُ مُنْفَصِلَةً كَقَوْلِنَا الْعَدَدُ إِمَّا زَوْخٌ وَإِمَّا فَرْدٌ.

A proposition<sup>18</sup> is a statement that can be affirmed as being true or false.<sup>19</sup>

It is either:

- Categorical (*hamliyya*), like our statement, "Zaid is a writer" or "Zaid is not a writer;" or
- Conjunctive Conditional (*sharțiyya muttașila*), like our statement, "If the sun has risen, then daylight is present;" or

as "that which grows" or "body," then it is not fully restrictive. The same applies if a more remote differentia is used, such as "sentient," as all animals are included thereby (Ḥabannaka 64).

15 Or composed of its proximate differentia alone, such as "one who is rational" in relation to "human."

16 It would therefore not be valid to use a common accident, such as "walking" for "human," as other animals under the genus "creature" walk as well. Likewise, a separable particular accident cannot be used, such as "one who actually laughs" for "human," as such a trait is separable since some humans are not able to laugh; rather, "one who could potentially laugh," is valid as it includes all humans, since those who cannot laugh could potentially do so were it not for their impediments. Another example of a valid complete description is "an eating body that grows" for "creature," as "body that grows" is its proximate genus, and "eating" is an inseparable particular accident (Habannaka 65).

17 The incomplete description of something can use either its inseparable particular accidents alone, like "one who could potentially laugh" or "one who is receptive to knowledge and the skill of writing" for "human"; or with its remote genus, like "a body that could potentially laugh" for "human"; or with its common accidents, or simply many accidents that together are particular to its reality, like the example above in the text (Ḥabannaka 66).

A fifth way of defining something is with a more well-known synonym (*ta'rīf bi 'l-lafz*), such as defining *ghadanfar* (an obscure word for "lion") as *asad* (a well-known word for "lion") (Akhdarī 28, Damanhūrī 8-9). A sixth way is to define something with an example (*ta*'*rīf bi*'*l-mithāl*), such as defining a "noun" as "that which resembles the words Zaid, man, or who," or like defining a "verb" as "that which resembles the words heard, say, or take."

A seventh way is to define something by categorization (*ta'rīf bi 'l-taqsīm*), such as the way a "word" is defined in books of Arabic grammar, namely, "noun, verb, and particle," or like defining a "number" as "either even or odd."

These last three types of defining something are considered general descriptions ( $rus\bar{u}m$ ), not formal definitions ( $hud\bar{u}d$ ) (Habannaka 63, 66-7).

18 Propositions and their related rulings are deemed the foundations of affirmation ( $mab\bar{a}di'al$ - $tasd\bar{a}q\bar{a}t$ ), in that one starts with propositions and uses them to arrive at the end points of affirmation ( $maq\bar{a}sid al$ - $tasd\bar{a}q\bar{a}t$ ), which are syllogisms (*sing. qiyās*). Sound syllogisms then lead to sound affirmation (Damanhūrī 9, 12).

19 That is, in and of itself, without consideration given to other factors. Hence, even statements that are decisively true or false for extraneous reasons are deemed propositions in logic. For example, statements by Allāh Most High or His Messenger 2 are included, despite being absolutely true, since they are true because of the speaker; the statement itself—as a statement—can be affirmed as false if no consideration is given to the speaker. Likewise, a statement like "One is half of eight," is a proposition in logic despite being obviously false, since it is false due to an extraneous factor in that it contradicts intuitive reasoning, not in and of itself as a statement (Damanhūrī 9-10). Propositions include only declarative statements (*jumla*  • Disjunctive Conditional (*sharṭiyya munfaṣila*), like our statement, "A number is either even or odd."



The first part of a categorical proposition is termed the subject  $(mawd\bar{u}')$ , and the second [part is termed] the predicate  $(mahm\bar{u}l)$ .

The first part of a conditional proposition is termed the antecedent (*muqaddam*), and the second [part is termed] the consequent ( $t\bar{a}l\bar{t}$ ).

وَالْقَضِيَّةُ إِمَّا مُوجَبَةٌ كَقَوْلِنَا زَيْلًا كَاتِبٌ، وَإِمَّا سَالِبَةٌ كَقَوْلِنَا زَيْلًا لَيْسَ بِكاتِبٍ.

A propostion is either affirmative ( $m\bar{u}jaba$ ), like our statement, "Zaid is a writer;" or negative ( $s\bar{a}liba$ ), like our statement, "Zaid is not a writer."<sup>20</sup>

وَكُلُّ وَاحِدَةٍ مِنْهُمَا إِمَّا مَحْصُوصَةٌ كَمَا ذَكَرْنَا، وَإِمَّا كُلَّيَّةٌ مُسَوَّرَةٌ كَقَوْلِنَا كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ كَاتِبٌ، وَلاَ شَيْءَ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِكاتِب، وَإِمَّا جُزْئِيَّةٌ مُسَوَّرَةٌ كَقَوْلِنَا بَعْضُ الْإِنْسَانِ كَاتِبٌ، وبَعْضُ الْإِنْسَانِ لَيْسَ بِكاتِبٍ، وَإِمَّا أَنْ لاَ يَكُونَ كَذلِكَ وَتُسَمَّى مُهْمَلَةً كَقَوْلِنَا الْإِنْسَانُ كَاتِبٌ وَالْإِنْسَانُ لَيْس بِكاتِبٍ.

*khabariyya*), not affective statements (*jumla inshā'iyya*) such as commands, prohibitions, and the like. For example, statements like "Give me my lunch," or "Do not take my money," are not propositions, as they cannot be affirmed as true or false in the first place (Habannaka 68).

20 This aspect of a proposition is referred to as its qualitative component (*kayf*), namely, whether it is affirmative or negative. The next discussion in the text deals with its quantitative component (*kamm*), namely, the number of individuals or entities the proposition deals with in its ruling (Habannaka 69).

21 The word used in Arabic is *ba'*, which here refers to one or more members of a group (Bājūrī 42). So even though "some" is English implies plurality, "particularity" in propositions refers to one member or more.

22 An indeterminate proposition (*muhmala*) is effectively a particular determinate proposition (*juz'iyya*), since one assumes the least possible quantity indicated (Habbanaka 70). For example with regards to the proposition "The human is a writer," it would hold true if merely some humans were writers; it is not necessary for all humans to be writers for the statement to be true, even though in reality all humans might very well be writers. Hence, one assumes the least possible quantity when assessing a proposition, which in the case of an indeterminate proposition would be its equivalent particular determinate proposition.

- 23 Hence, there are a total of eight possible categorical propositions. The following is a list with examples:
- Affirmative singular: Muhammad ﷺ is the Messenger of Alläh; Imäms Bukhärī and Muslim relate sound narrations;

The four rightly-guided caliphs are the elite of the Companions.

- Negative singular: Musaylima is not a messenger; The black stone brings no benefit nor harm; "That is the book—there is no doubt therein" (Qur'ān 2:2).
- Affirmative universal: "Everything therein shall perish" (Qur'ān 55:26); "Every soul shall taste death" (Qur'ān 21:35);
  "Every soul is held as collateral for what it earns" (Qur'ān 74:38); "Everything, with Him, is fully measured" (Qur'ān 13:8).
- Negative universal: Nothing of stone is a human; There is no partner with Allāh; Allāh has no child or spouse whatsoever; "Neither slumber nor sleep overtakes Him" (Qur'ān 2:255).
- Affirmative particular: "A group will be in Paradise, and a group will be in the Inferno" (Qur'ān 42:7); "So of them are those who crawl on their bellies, and of them are those who walk on two legs, and of them are those who walk on [all] four" (Qur'ān 24:45); "And from among the People of the Book is he who, were you to entrust him with an entire treasure, would return it to you" (Qur'ān 3:75); "And of mankind are some who take besides Allāh equals" (Qur'ān 2:165); "And so few of My servants are of much gratitude" (Qur'ān 34:13).
- Negative particular: "Most people, however, do not show gratitude" (Qur'ān 12:38); "Nor do some of them follow the qibla of others" (Qur'ān 2:145); "And of them is he who, were you to entrust him with [even] one gold coin, would not return it to you" (Qur'ān 3:75); "And most people, even were you to be very avid, will not believe" (Qur'ān 12:103).
- Affirmative indeterminate: This is effectively an affirmative, particular proposition. For example, the statement "Humans eat beef" is akin to saying "Some humans eat beef," or "Fools

Each one of the two is then either singular (*makhşūşa*) [or *shakhşiyya*] as we have mentioned; or universal determinate (kulliyya musawwara), like our statement, "Every human is a writer," or "No human is a writer;" or particular determinate (*juz'iyya musawwara*),<sup>21</sup> like our statement, "Some humans are writers," or "Some humans are not writers;" or other than that, which is termed indeterminate (muhmala),<sup>22</sup> like our statement, "The human is a writer," or "The human is not a writer."<sup>23</sup>

وَالْمَتَصِلَةُ إِمَّا لُزُومِيَّةٌ كَقَوْلِنَا إِنْ كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةً فالنَّهَارُ مَوْجُودٌ، وَإِمَّا اتِّفَاقِيَّةٌ كَقَوْلِنَا إِنْ كَانَ الْإِنْسَانُ نَاطِقًا فَالْجِمَارُ نَاهِقٌ.

The conjunctive conditional proposition<sup>24</sup> is either mandatory ( $luz\bar{u}miyya$ ), like our statement, "If the sun has risen, then daylight is present;" or coincidental (*ittifāqiyya*), like our statement, "If a human is rational, then a donkey brays."<sup>25</sup>

وَالْمُنْفَصِلَةُ إِمَّا حَقِيقِيَّةٌ كَقَوْلِنَا الْعَدَدُ إِمَّا زَوْجٌ وَإِمَّا فَرْدٌ، وَهِيَ مَانِعَةُ الجَمْعِ وَالْخُلُوِّ مَعًا، وَ[إِمَّا] مَانِعَةُ الجَمْعِ فَقَطْ كَقَولِنَا هذا الشَّيْءُ إِمَّا حَجَرٌ أَوْ شَجَرٌ، وَإِمَّا مَانِعَةُ الْخُلُوَّ فَقَطْ كَقَوْلِنَا زَيْدُ إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ فِي الْبَحْرِ وَإِمَّا أَنْ لاَ يَغْرَقَ.

The disjunctive conditional proposition is either: literal (*haqīqiyya*),<sup>26</sup> like our statement, "A number is either even or odd." This is [also called] mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive (*māniʿat al-jamʿ wal-khuluww maʿan*); [or it is] mutually exclusive only (*māniʿat al-jamʿ faqat*), like our statement, "This thing is either a stone or a tree;"<sup>27</sup> or [it is] totally exhaustive only (*māniʿat al-khuluww faqat*), like our statement, "Zaid is either in a body of water, or is not drowning."<sup>28</sup>

among people will say, —What has turned them from the qibla that they were upon beforehand?'" (Qur'ān 2:142) is akin to "Some fools among people..."; or "Verily, people have gathered against you" (Qur'ān 3:173) is akin to "Some people have gathered..."; or "And the people of Nūḥ—when they denied the messengers, We drowned them" (Qur'ān 25:37) is akin to "And some of the people of Nūḥ..."

- Negative indeterminate: This is effectively a negative, particular proposition. For example, the statement "Humans do not ride cows" is akin to saying "Some humans do not ride cows;" or "People that can swim do not drown" is akin to "Some people that can swim do not drown;" or "The human does not become weary from asking of good" (Qur'ān 41:49) is akin to "Some humans do not become weary..." (Habannaka 83-5).
- 24 Examples from the Qur'ān include the following:
- "And when the Qur'an is recited to them, they do not prostrate" (84:21);
- "Every time they ignite the fire of war, Allāh puts it out" (5:64);
- "Had there been therein gods besides Allāh, they both (the heavens and the earth) would have been disordered" (21:22);
- "And if all the trees in the earth were pens, and the sea, with seven more seas to help it, (were ink), the words of Allāh would not be exhausted" (31:27);
- "And they said, —Whatever sign you bring to us, so as to bewitch us thereby, we shall never believe in you." (7:132);
- "And were it not for the fact that all of mankind would have been united as one (evil) community, We would have made for whoever disbelieves in the All-Merciful silver roofs for their

houses, and (silver) stairways upon which they could ascend" (43:33) (Habannaka 88-90).

25 A mandatory conjunctive conditional proposition simply means that the consequent is a logically bound to the antecedent, such as "If Zaid is Khalid's son, then Khalid is Zaid's father;" while a coincidental conjunctive conditional proposition means the two are logically unrelated, but rather just happen to coincide, such as "If Abū Ḥanīfa is a jurist, then Bukhārī is a ḥadīth specialist" (Habannaka 93-5).

26 This is termed literal as it is the most specific of the three types and hence is most deserving of being termed "disjunctive" (Damanhūrī 10-11).

It is mutually exclusive in that both or all options cannot be simultaneously true; it is also totally exhaustive, in that the ruling must necessarily apply to one of the options as no other possibility is valid. Examples include "A thing is either existent or nonexistent;" "A physical entity is either moving or still;" "The height of a tree is either more than, equal to, or less than three

meters;" "The temperature is either more than, equal to, or less than zero degrees;" and from the Qur'ān, "Verily We have shown him the way; he is then either grateful, or an utter ingrate" (76:3) (Ḥabannaka 97-8).

27 This type of disjunctive conditional proposition is only mutually exclusive, in that both or all options cannot be simultaneously true, yet it is not totally exhaustive, such that neither option is valid but rather another option is valid. An example is "The moon is either larger than or equal in size to the earth," as another possibly valid option exists, namely, that it is smaller than the earth (which is true) (Habannaka 99).

The [aforementioned three types of] disjunctive propositions could be made up of three [or more] parts [rather than just two], like our statement, "The number is either greater than, less than, or equal to."

Contradiction (Tanāquḍ)

وَهُوَ اخْتِلاَفُ الْقَضِيَّتِينِ بِالْإِيجَابِ وَالسَّلْبِ بِحَيْثُ يَقْتَضِي لِذَاتِهِ أَنْ تَكُونَ إِحْدَاهُمَا صَادِقَةً وَالْأُحْرَى كَاذِبَةً، كَقَوْلِنَا زَيْدٌ كَاتِبٌ، زَيْدٌ لَيْسَ بِكَاتِبَ. وَلاَ يَتَحَقَّقُ ذلِكَ إِلاَّ بَعْدَ اتِّفَاقِهِمَا فِي المَوْضُوعِ وَالمَحْمُولِ وَالزَّمَانِ وَالمَكَانِ وَالْإِضَافَةِ وَالْفُوَّةِ وَالْفِعْلِ وَالْكُلِّ وَالجُزْءِ وَالشَّرْطِ.

It is the difference of two propositions in affirmation or negation, such that in and of itself one of the two must be true and the other [must be] false,<sup>29</sup> like our statement, "Zaid is a writer; Zaid is not a writer."

This does not occur unless they both correspond in subject, predicate, time, place, relation, potentiality, actuality, whole, part, and condition.<sup>30</sup>

فَنَقِيضُ الُوحَبَةِ الْكُلِّيَّةِ إِنَّمَا هُوَ السَّالِبَةُ الجُزْئِيَّةُ كَقَوْلِنَا كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ حَيَوانٌ، بَعْضُ الْإِنْسَانِ لَيْسَ بِحَيَوانٍ. وَنَقِيضُ السَّالِبَةِ الْكُلِّيَّةِ إِنَّمَا هُوَ المُوحَبَةُ الجُزْئِيَّةُ كَقَوْلِنَا لاَ شَيْءَ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِحَيَوانٍ، بَعْضُ الْإِنْسَانِ حَيَوانٌ.

28 This third type of disjunctive conditional proposition is only totally exhaustive, in that the ruling must necessarily apply to one of the options as no other possibility is valid, yet is not mutually exclusive, as both or all options could be simultaneously true. For example, "A righteous person that one keeps company with is like the seller of musk—he will either allow you to wear some, or sell some to you, or you will [at least] inhale a pleasant scent from him." One of these options will necessarily occur, yet any two or even all three could occur as well (Habannaka 99-100).

29 This principle is the basis of contradiction—both contradictory propositions cannot conceivably be true, nor both false; rather, one alone must be true, and the other must be false (Habannaka 156).

30 For a singular proposition (makhṣūṣa or shakhṣiyya), contradiction is valid only if the two propositions differ only in the qualitative component (kayf), i.e., affirmation versus negation; they must correspond in all other aspects, conditions, and stipulations, as stated above (Ḥabannaka 157). For example, "Zaid is a writer; Zaid is not a writer," would be contradictory assuming all other aspects were

the same. However, if the first proposition referred to the writing of English, while the second one referred to the writing of Arabic, then both could be true, or both could be false, and hence would not be contradictory propositions.

Another example is the verse in the Qur'ān (34:3), "And the disbelievers say, —The hour will not come upon us.|| Say: No! indeed by my Lord, it will come upon you." The first proposition is negative, singular; the second one is affirmative, singular. Both

correspond in every aspect and perspective, differing only in the qualitative component (kayf). Hence, the two are contradictory; one must be true, and the other false. So after the verse quotes the disbelievers|| proposition, Allāh responds immediately with "No!" (balā) to indicate that theirs is false. He then follows it with its contradictory proposition, which must therefore be true, namely, that the Hour will surely come upon them. He Most High also emphasizes its veracity further with an oath, "By my Lord!"

This differs from the following verse: "So you killed them not, yet Allāh killed them. And you threw not when you threw, but rather Allāh Himself threw" (Qur'ān 8:17). There is no contradiction here between the negation of the Messenger||s throwing "And you threw not" and its affirmation "when you threw," as the first proposition deals with the perspective of the effect of the throw, namely, death, while the second proposition deals with the act itself and its form, namely, the actual throwing (Ḥabannaka 158–60).

**31** With respect to determinate propositions, contradiction is not valid by the reversal of the qualitative component (kayf) alone. For example, "Every creature is a human" is an affirmative, universal proposition that is false. If one reversed its qualitative component alone, it would become the negative, universal proposition "No creature is human." This statement is also false, and therefore cannot be the contradictory proposition of the first statement. Rather, one must reverse its quantitative component (kamm) as well, so as to become the negative, particular proposition "Some creatures are not human," which is a true statement, and hence the contradictory proposition of the first statement.

This does not preclude the fact that sometimes a reversal of

Hence, the contradictory proposition of an affirmative, universal proposition (*mūjaba kulliyya*) is only a negative, particular proposition (*sāliba juz'iyya*), like our statement, "Every human is a creature; Some humans are not creatures."<sup>31</sup>

The contradictory proposition of a negative universal proposition (*sāliba kulliyya*) is only an affirmative particular proposition (*mūjaba juz'iyya*),<sup>32</sup> like our statement, "No human is a creature; Some humans are creatures."

وَالَحْصُوْرَتَانِ لاَ يَتَحَقَّقُ التَّنَاقُضُ بَيْنَهُمَا إِلاَّ بَعْدَ اخْتِلاَفِهِمَا فِي الْكَمِّيَّةِ لِأَنَّ الْكُلِّيَّتَيْنِ قَدْ تَكْذِبَانِ كَقَوْلِنَا كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ كَاتِبٌ، وَلاَ شَيْءَ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِكَاتِبٍ، وَالجُزْئِيَّتَيْنِ قَدْ تَصْدُقَانِ كَقَوْلِنَا بَعْضُ الْإِنْسَانِ كَاتِبٌ، بَعْضُ الْإِنْسَانِ لَيْسَ بِكَاتِب.

Two determinate propositions [with quantifiers] cannot be mutually contradictory unless they differ in quantity, for two universal propositions could both be false, like our statement, "Every human is a writer; No human is a writer;" and two particular propositions could both be true, like our statement, "Some humans are writers; Some humans are not writers."

#### Conversion (Aks)

وَهُوَ أَنْ يَصِيرَ المَوْضُوْعُ مَحْمُوْلاً وَالمَحْمُوْلُ مَوْضُوْعًا مَعَ بَقَاء الْإِيجَابِ وَالسَّلْبِ بحَالِهِ وَالتَّصْدِيْق وَالتَّكْذِيْب بحَالِهِ.

It is for the subject to become a predicate, and the predicate a subject, while retaining its original negation or affirmation, and truthfulness or falsehood.<sup>33</sup>

the qualitative component (kayf) alone might result in one true proposition and one false one, such as "Every human is a creature" and "No human is a creature." Yet this occurs only because the predicate of the first statement is more general than its subject, and cannot be used to extrapolate a general rule of contradiction that can be consistently applied to all affirmative, universal propositions, as proven by the previous example (in which the reversal of the qualitative component alone did not result in contradiction).

Likewise, for a negative, universal proposition such as "No creature is a human," contradiction does not occur by reversing the qualitative component alone, as that would result in "Every creature is a human," both statements being false. Rather, one must also reverse the quantitative component (kamm), resulting in "Some creatures are human," which is true and hence contradictory to the original false proposition.

Therefore, contradiction is not valid between two affirmative propositions; two negative propositions; two universal propositions; two particular propositions; nor if any aspect differs between the two propositions, such as subject, predicate, time, place, state, object, potentiality, condition, stipulation, wholeness, partiality, relativeness, etc.

Finally, contradiction is very useful in establishing a proof—by affirming the falsehood of its contradictory proposition—or in disproving a false claim—by affirming the truthfulness of its contradictory proposition (Habannaka 162–7).

**32** An indeterminate proposition (muhmala) is effectively a particular determinate proposition (juz'iyya) (see related note, page ???). Therefore, the contradictory proposition of "The

human is a creature" (muhmala mūjaba) is also "No human is a creature" (sāliba kulliyya) (Damanhūrī 11).

**33** The underlying principle of conversion is that truthfulness or falsehood must be retained; otherwise, the conversion is not valid.

If both the subject and predicate of a proposition are singular, then conversion is valid by switching the subject and predicate alone, while retaining both its qualitative and quantitative components (kayf and kamm). For example, "Abū Ḥafṣ is 'Umar" converts to "'Umar is Abū Ḥafṣ," and "Zaid is not 'Amr" converts to "'Amr is not Zaid."

All affirmative propositions convert to affirmative particular propositions, regardless of whether the original statement is universal, particular, indeterminate, or singular (unless both the subject and predicate are singular, as just discussed).

Examples are as follows:

- Affirmative universal "Every human is a creature" converts to affirmative particular "Some creatures are human," since were it to remain universal it would be "Every creature is human," which is not true like the original statement.
- Affirmative particular "Some plants are edible" converts to affirmative particular "Some edible things are plants."
- Affirmative indeterminate "The bird is a creature" converts to affirmative particular "Some creatures are birds."
- Affirmative singular "Imām Shāfi'ī is a renowned jurist" converts to affirmative particular "Of the renowned jurists is Imām Shāfi'ī."

An affirmative universal proposition (*mūjaba kulliyya*) does not convert to a universal, since our statement, "Every human is a creature," is true, while "Every creature is a human," is not true; rather, it converts to a particular (*juz'iyya*), since when we say, "Every human is a creature," the statement "Some creatures are human," is true, for indeed we find a thing described as being a human and a creature, such that some creatures are humans.

# وَالُوْحَبَةُ الجُزْئِيَّةُ أَيْضًا تَنْعَكِسُ جُزْئِيَّةً بِهذِهِ الحُجَّةِ. وَالسَّالِبَةُ الْكُلِّيَّةُ تَنْعَكِسُ [سَالِبَةً] كُلِّيَّةً، وَذلِكَ بَيِّنُ بِنَفْسِهِ فَإِنَّهُ إِذَا صَدَقَ لاَ شَيْءَ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِحَجَرٍ، صَدَقَ قَوْلُنَا لاَ شَيْءَ مِنَ الحَجَرِ بِإِنْسَانٍ.

Likewise, an affirmative particular proposition (*mūjaba juz'iyya*) converts to a particular (*juz'iyya*) by this proof, and a negative universal proposition (*sāliba kulliyya*) converts to a [negative] universal (*sāliba kulliyya*). This is evident in and of itself, since if "No human is a stone," is true, then our statement "No stone is a human," is true.

Negative universal propositions convert to negative universal propositions. For example, "No Muslim denies the message of Muhammad " converts to "No one who denies the message of Muhammad is Muslim." Likewise, "Nothing of fornication is permissible" converts to "Nothing permissible is from fornication."

Negative singular propositions (whose predicates are not also singular) also convert to negative universal propositions. For example, "Khalid is not a coward" converts to "No coward is Khalid" (Ḥabannaka 178–81). 34 The same ruling applies to an indeterminate proposition (muhmala), as it is effectively a particular determinate proposition (juz'iyya). Hence, "A creature is not a human," which can be true, has no converse, as "A human is not a creature," cannot be true (Damanhūrī 11–12).
وَالسَّالِبَةُ الجُزْئِيَّةُ لاَ عَكْسَ لَهَا لُزُومًا، لِأَنَّهُ يَصْدُقُ قَوْلُنَا بَعْضُ الحَيَوَانِ لَيْسَ بإِنْسَانٍ، وَلاَ يَصْدُقُ عَكْسُهُ.

A negative particular proposition (*sāliba juz'iyya*)<sup>34</sup> has no necessary converse, for indeed "Some creatures are not human," is true, while its conversion [i.e., some humans are not creatures] is not true.

## Syllogism (Qiyās)

هُوَ قَوْلٌ [مَلْفُوْظٌ أَوْ مَعْقُوْلٌ] مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنْ أَقْوَال مَتَى سُلِّمَتْ لَزِمَ عَنْهَا لِذَاتِهَا قَوْلُ آخَرُ. وَهُوَ إِمَّا اقْتِرَانِيٌّ كَقَوْلِنَا كُلُّ حِسْمٍ مُؤَلَّفٌ وَكُلُّ مُؤَلَّفٍ مُحْدَثٌ فَكُلٌ حِسْمٍ مُحْدَثٌ، وَإِمَّا اسْتِثْنَائِيٌّ كَقَوْلِنَا إِنْ كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةً فَالنَّهَارُ مَوْجُوْدٌ لكِنِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةٌ فَالنَّهَارُ مَوَجُوْدٌ وَكَقَوْلِنَا إِنْ كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةٌ فَالنَّهَارُ مَوْجُوْدٌ لكِنِ النَّهَارُ مَوْجُوْدٌ لكِنِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةٌ فَالنَّهَارُ مَوَجُوْدٌ

It is a [verbally uttered or mentally comprehended] inference composed of statements [i.e., propositions] that, if conceded, in and of themselves<sup>35</sup> [necessarily] give rise to a third statement [i.e., the conclusion].

It is either by coupling (*iqtirānī*), like our statement, "Every physical body is composed, and every composed thing is originated; hence, every physical body is originated;" or by exclusion (*istithnā'ī*), like our statement, "If the sun has risen, then daylight is present. And indeed the sun has risen; hence, daylight is present," or like our statement, "If the sun has risen, then daylight is present. However, daylight is not present; hence, the sun has not risen."<sup>36</sup>

35 That is, a valid syllogism necessarily results in a conclusion due to no extraneous consideration or evidence, but rather in and of itself, based on its form and mood alone (Habannaka 228).

in that there is a particle of exclusion, or exception, between its two premises, namely, "however" or "and indeed." Also, its conclusion (or the contradictory proposition of its conclusion) exists in actuality within the two premises, the only difference being that its ruling in the premise is conditional, while its ruling in the conclusion is a definitive assertion (see above example) (Habannaka 228).

<sup>36</sup> A syllogism by coupling is distinct in that the two premises are coupled by the conjunction "and." Also, its conclusion is potentially embedded within its two premises, but not actually present (see above example). A syllogism by exclusion is distinct

وَالْمُكَرَّرُ بَيْنَ مُقَدِّمَتَي القِيَاسِ يُسَمَّى حَدًّا أَوْسَطَ. وَمَوْضُوْعُ الَطْلُوبِ يُسَمَّى حَدًّا أَصْغَرَ. وَمَحْمُوْلُهُ يُسَمَّى حَدًّا أَكْبَرَ. وَالْمُقَدِّمَةُ الَّتِي فِيهَا الْأَصْغَرُ تُسَمَّى صُغْرَى، وَالْقَدِّمَةُ الَّتِي فِيهَا الْأَكْبَرُ تُسَمَّى كُبْرَى. وَهَيْئَةُ التَّالِيْفِ مِنَ الْصُّغْرَى وَالْكُبْرَى تُسَمَّى شَكْلاً.

The statement that is repeated within the two propositions is called the middle term (*hadd awsat*). The subject of the conclusion is called the minor term (*hadd asghar*), and its predicate is called the major term (*hadd akbar*).<sup>37</sup> The proposition that contains the minor term is called the minor premise (*sughrā*), and the proposition that contains the major term is called the major premise (*kubrā*). The form of its composition of the minor premise and major premise is called the figure (*shakl*).

وَالْأَشْكَالُ أَرْبَعَةٌ، لِأَنَّ الحَدَّ الْأَوْسَطَ إِنْ كَانَ مَحْمُوْلاً فِي الصُّغْرَى وَمَوْضُوعًا فِي الْكُبْرَى فَهُوَ الشَّكْلُ الْأَوَّلُ، وَإِنْ كَانَ بِالْعَكْسِ فَهُوَ الرَّابِعُ، وَإِنْ كَانَ مَوْضُوْعًا فِيْهِمَا فَهُوَ التَّالِثُ، وَإِنْ مَحْمُوْلاً فِيْهِمَا فَهُوَ الثَّاني.فَهذِهِ هِيَ الْأَشْكَالُ الْأَرْبَعَةُ الْمَذْكُوَرَةُ فِي الْمَنْطِق.

> There are four figures,<sup>38</sup> for if the middle term is the predicate of the minor premise and the subject of the major premise, the form is the first figure (*shakl awwal*); the opposite is the fourth [figure] (*shakl rābi*'). If it is the subject of both, the form is the third (*shakl thālith*), and if it is the predicate of both, the form is the second (*shakl thānī*). These, then, are the four figures of a syllogism in logic.<sup>39</sup>

37 The major term is rightfully called that, since it must be more general (a'amm) than the minor term; if it is more specific than the minor term, the syllogism will not be valid (Habannaka 230).

38 Logically there can only be four figures. Logically, each figure can have sixteen moods, yet only some of them are valid, i.e., result in sound conclusions. The valid moods, with their accompanying conditions, are essential in the study of syllogisms, since not every syllogism yields a valid conclusion, even if it has all the components of a syllogism. For example, "No human is a stone, and no stone is a creature; hence, no human is a creature" or "Hence, some humans are not creatures." Although this syllogism is composed of a major and minor premise, and the minor, middle and major terms, either conclusion is invalid because the syllogism does not fulfill the conditions of a valid mood, as explicated below (Habannaka 233, 236).

39 The four figures are numbered in order of excellence, the first being the best, followed by the second, etc. A syllogism that is not based on one of these four figures is not sound, such as, "Every human is a creature, and every horse neighs" (Damanhūrī 13).

[The second figure turns into the first by converting the major premise, and the third turns into it (the first) by converting the minor premise. The fourth turns into it (the first) by converting the order (of the two premises) or by converting both premises. The perfect type of syllogism, which yields its conclusion for all types of propositions, is the first figure.<sup>40</sup>]

The fourth figure is very unnatural. The one who has a sound intellect and an upright nature does not need to turn the second into the first. The second only yields a conclusion when the premises differ in affirmation and negation.

وَالشَّكْلُ الْأَوَّلُ هُوَ الَّذِيْ جُعِلَ مِعْيَارًا لِلْعُلُومِ. فَنُوْرِدُهُ هُنَا لِيُجْعَلَ دُسْتُورًا وَيُسْتَنْتَجَ مِنْهُ الْمَطْلُوْبُ. [وَشَرْطُ إِنْتَاجِهِ إِيجَابُ الصُّغْرَى وَكُلِّيَّةُ الْكُبْرَى.]

The first figure is the one that is considered a standard for various fields of study, so we will explain it here for it to serve as a template and so the aim may be derived

40 This paragraph is not present in the text used for this translation, but is found in another copy of the text (Mutūn al-Mantiq wa 'l- Hikma) and was taken from there.

The first figure corresponds most to natural sequence of thought, as the mind naturally moves from the minor term to the middle term to the major term. Moreover, in and of itself gives rise to all types of conclusions, namely, affirmative universal, negative universal, affirmative particular, and negative particular. As for singular conclusions, they are effectively universal, and as for indeterminate conclusions, they are effectively particular (Ḥabannaka 236). thereby. [The conditions for it to yield a conclusion are affirmation of the minor premise and universality of the major premise.]<sup>41</sup>

Its valid moods  $(dur\bar{u}b)$  that yield a conclusion are four:

1. The First Valid Mood<sup>42</sup> is for example: Every physical body is composed, and every composed thing is originated; hence, every physical body is originated.

2. The Second Valid Mood<sup>43</sup> is for example: Every physical body is composed, and nothing that is composed is preeternal; hence, no physical body is preeternal.

3. The Third Valid Mood<sup>44</sup> is for example: Some physical bodies are composed, and every composed thing is temporal; hence, some physical bodies are temporal.

4. The Fourth Valid Mood<sup>45</sup> is for example: Some physical bodies are composed, and nothing that is composed is preeternal; hence, some physical bodies are not preeternal.<sup>46</sup>

**41** This sentence is not present in the text used for this translation, but is found in another copy of the text (Mutūn al-Mantiq wa 'l- Ḥikma) and was taken from there.

**42** Both premises are affirmative universal. The conclusion is affirmative universal (Damanhūrī 13). Other examples are as follows:

Every fish is a creature, and every creature moves by its own volition; hence, every fish moves by its own volition. From prophetic speech:

"Every son of Adam is a sinner, and the best of sinners are the oft-repentant" (Tirmidhī, Ibn Mājā with slight variation in wording) which yields the conclusion "The best of the children of Adam are the oft-repentant." Of course, for the major premise to be complete, the following is implied therein "Of all sinners, the best of sinners are the oft-repentant."

"Each of you is from Ādam, and Ādam is from dust" (Abū Dāwūd, Tirmidhī with slight variation in wording) which yields the conclusion "Each of you is from dust."

"Each of you is a shepherd, and every shepherd is responsible for his flock" (Bukhārī, Muslim with slight variation in wording) which yields the conclusion "Each of you is responsible for his flock" (Habannaka 239-40).

43 Both premises are universal; the minor premise is affirmative, and the major premise is negative. The conclusion is negative universal (Damanhūrī 13). Other examples are as follows:

"Every soul is held as collateral for what it earns" (Qur'ān 74:38), and no one is held as collateral for what it earns unless it has free will; hence, there is no soul that earns except that it has free will.

- "Everything therein [the earth] shall perish, and the face of your Lord remains forever" (Qur'ān 55:26–7), and nothing that will perish is preeternal; hence, nothing therein [earth] is preeternal.
- "Every soul shall taste death" (Qur'ān 21:35), and nothing dies except that it has life; hence, there is no soul except that it has life (Ḥabannaka 242-3).

44 Both premises are affirmative; the minor premise is particular, and the major premise is universal. The conclusion is affirmative particular (Damanhūrī 13). Other examples are as follows:

- "And of mankind are those who say, —We believe in Allāh and the Last Day|| yet they are not really believers" (Qur'ān 2:8), and anyone who says, "I believe in Allāh and the Last Day" while lying is a hypocrite; hence, among mankind are hypocrites.
- "And indeed, many people are trangressors" (Qur'ān 5:49), and every trangressor is misguided; hence, many people are misguided. "And of mankind is he who sells himself seeking the good pleasure of Allāh" (Qur'ān 2:207), and anyone who sells himself seeking the good pleasure of Allāh is granted Paradise; hence, of mankind is a group granted Paradise (Ḥabannaka 244).

45 The minor premise is affirmative particular, and the major premise is negative universal. The conclusion is negative particular (Damanhūrī 14). Other examples are as follows:

وَالإِقْتِرَانِيُّ إِمَّا مُرَكَّبٌ مِنْ حَمْلِيَّتَيْنِ كَمَا مَرَّ،

A syllogism by coupling is either composed of two categorical propositions, as explained above;

Or of two conjunctive conditional propositions, like our statement, "If the sun has risen, then daylight is present; and whenever daylight is present, the earth is illuminated," which yields, "If the sun has risen, the earth is illuminated;"

Or of two disjunctive conditional propositions, like our statement, "Every number is either even or odd, and every even number is either a pair of even numbers or a pair of odd numbers," which yields from these two propositions, "Every number is either odd, a pair of even numbers, or a pair of odd numbers;"

- Some people perform righteous works, and no one who performs righteous works is cheated; hence, some people are not cheated.
- Some of those who perform works will be recompensed well by Allāh, and no one who is recompensed well by Allāh is miserable; hence, some of those who perform works are not miserable (Habannaka 246).

**46** After the above presentation of the valid moods for the first figure, the following serves as a presentation of the valid moods for the remaining three figures. All examples are of categorical propositions, although the four figures and their valid moods apply also to conditional propositions.

#### Figure Two:

There are two conditions for it to yield a sound conclusion: (1) the minor and major premises must differ in affirmation and negation, and (2) the major premise must be universal.

This figure has a total of four valid moods, as follows:

1. Every human is a creature, and no stone is a creature; hence, no human is a stone. Both premises are universal; the minor premise is affirmative, and the major premise is negative. The conclusion is negative universal.

Other examples are as follows:

Everyone who actually laughs is happy, and no sad person is happy; hence, no one who actually laughs is sad. Every living person eats, and no idol eats; hence, no living person is an idol.

2. No stone is a creature, and every human is a creature; hence,

no stone is a human. Both premises are universal; the minor premise is negative, and the major premise is affirmative. The conclusion is negative universal.

Other examples are as follows:

No sad person is happy, and anyone who actually laughs is happy; hence, no sad person actually laughs. No horse is a human, and anyone who laughs is a human; hence, no horse laughs.

There is nothing vain in Paradise, and all good is in Paradise; hence, nothing vain is good.

3. Some humans are creatures, and no stone is a creature; hence, some humans are not stones. The minor premise is affirmative particular, and the major premise is negative universal. The conclusion is negative particular.

Other examples are as follows:

Some people can write, and no unlettered person can write; hence, some people are not unlettered.

A group of people will be in Paradise, and no disbeliever will be in Paradise; hence, some people are not disbelievers.

"And of mankind is he whose speech about the life of this world pleases you, and he calls Allāh to witness as to that which is in his heart, yet he is the most contentious of adversaries" (Qur'ān 2:204), and no pious believer is of this description; hence, some people are not of this description.

4. Some stones are not creatures, and every human is a creature; hence, some stones are not human. The minor premise is

negative particular, and the major premise is affirmative universal. The conclusion is negative particular.

Other examples are as follows:

Some fruits are not bitter, and every fruit from the colocynth plant is bitter; hence, some fruits are not from the colocynth plant.

Some people will not enter Paradise, and every believer will enter Paradise; hence, some people are not believers.

The conclusions for all four moods are negative; universal in the first two, particular in the last two.

#### Figure Three

There are two conditions for it to yield a sound conclusion: (1) the minor premise must be affirmative, and (2) one of the premises must be universal.

This figure has a total of six valid moods, as follows:

1. Every human is a creature, and every human is rational; hence, some creatures are rational. Both premises are affirmative universal. The conclusion is affirmative particular. Other examples are as follows:

Every human is a creature, and every human is receptive to knowledge and the skill of writing; hence, some creatures are receptive to knowledge and the skill of writing.

Every piece of gold is from a mine, and every piece of gold is not affected by acidity; hence, some things from mines are not affected by acidity.

2. Some humans are creatures, and every human is rational; hence, some creatures are rational. Both premises are affirmative; the minor premise is particular, and the major premise is universal. The conclusion is affirmative particular.

Other examples are as follows:

Some people are poets, and all people breathe with their lungs; hence, some poets breathe with their lungs. Some creatures are human, and every creature moves by volition; hence, some humans move by volition. Some roses are red, and every rose is a plant; hence, some red things are plants. 3. Every human is a creature, and some humans are rational; hence, some creatures are rational. Both premises are affirmative; the minor premise is universal, and the major premise is particular. The conclusion is affirmative particular.

Other examples are as follows:

Every architect is proficient in designing buildings, and some architects are artists; hence, some of those who are proficient in designing buildings are artists.

Everyone who can draw is an artist, and some people who can draw are crazy; hence, some artists are crazy.

4. Every human is a creature, and no human is a stone; hence, some creatures are not stones. Both premises are universal;

the minor premise is affirmative, and the major premise is negative. The conclusion is negative particular. Other examples are as follows:

Every sleeping person loses his external senses, and no sleeping person is legally responsible; hence, some people who lose external senses are not legally responsible.

Every insane person lacks rational thinking, and no insane person is legally responsible; hence, some people who lack rational thinking are not legally responsible.

Every architect is proficient in designing buildings, and no architect is blind; hence, some of those who are proficient in designing buildings are not blind.

5. Some humans are creatures, and no human is a stone; hence, some creatures are not stones. The minor premise is affirmative particular, and the major premise is negative universal. The conclusion is negative particular.

Other examples are as follows:

Some roses are red, and no rose is blood; hence, some red things are not blood. Some water is brackish, and no water is oil; hence, some brackish things are not oil.

6. Every human is a creature, and some humans are not stones; hence, some creatures are not stones. The minor premise is affirmative universal, and the major premise is negative particular. The conclusion is negative particular. Other examples are as follows:

Every minor is absolved from legal responsibility, and some minors have invalid prayers; hence, some of those absolved from legal responsibility have invalid prayers. [Note: The invalidity of the prayers is the negative component of both the major premise and the conclusion.]

Any water that remains of its original nature is pure, and some water that remains of its original nature is not water free from impurities; hence, some pure water is not free from impurities.

This figure, then, yields only particular conclusions affirmative in the first three moods, and negative in last three moods. Figure Four

There is one condition for the fourth figure to yield a conclusion, namely, the lack of both lower states being present (lower states referring to negation and particularity), except in one case.

This rule applies to four valid moods, and with the exception this figure has a total of five valid moods, as follows:

1. Every human is a creature, and every rational [entity] is a human; hence, some creatures are rational. Both premises are affirmative universal. The conclusion is affirmative particular.

Other examples are as follows:

Everyone who truly fears Allāh has knowledge of Him, and everyone who completely adheres to the rulings of the religion truly fears Allāh; hence, some of those who know Allāh completely adhere to the rulings of the religion.

Every star adorns the sky, and every effulgent heavenly body is a star, hence, some of the adornment of the sky is an effulgent heavenly body.

2. Every human is a creature, and some rational entities are human; hence, some creatures are rational. Both premises are affirmative; the minor premise is universal, and the major premise is particular. The conclusion is affirmative particular.

#### Other examples are as follows:

All milk is white, and some edible things are white; hence, some white things are edible.

Every egg has a shell, and some things that break are eggs; hence, some things with shells break.

3. No human is a stone, and every rational entity is a human; hence, no stone is rational. Both premises are universal; the minor premise is negative, and the major premise is affirmative. The conclusion is negative universal.

Other examples are as follows:

No human is a fish, and anyone who can laugh is a human; hence, no fish can laugh.

No parent can avail aught for his son on the Day of Arising (see Qur'ān 31:33), and every ancestor is a "parent;" hence, no ancestor can avail for any offspring on the Day of Arising.

4. Every human is a creature, and no stone is a human; hence, some creatures are not stones. Both premises are universal; the minor premise is affirmative, and the major premise is negative. The conclusion is negative particular.

Other examples are as follows:

Every camel has a long neck, and nothing with a hoof is a camel; hence, some things with long necks do not have hoofs.

Every scholar is of a higher rank than the ignorant person, and no bull is a scholar; hence, some of those of a higher rank than the ignorant person are not bulls.

5. Some humans are creatures, and no stone is a human; hence, some creatures are not stones. The minor premise is affirmative particular, and the major premise is negative universal; the conclusion is negative particular. This is the exception to the rule of this figure, as both lower states—negation and particularity are present in the figure.

Other examples are as follows:

Some people are believers, and no angel is a human; hence, some believers are not angels.

Some meat is licit to eat, and no cucumber is meat; hence, some of what is licit to eat is not cucumber.

There is some discrepancy in the order of some of the moods for figures three and four; the above order was taken from Imām

Or of a categorical proposition and a conjunctive conditional proposition, like our statement, "As long as this is a human, he is a creature; and every creature is a body," which yields, "As long as this is a human, he is a body;"<sup>148</sup>

Or of a categorical proposition and a disjunctive conditional proposition, like our statement, "Every number is either even or odd, and every even number is divisible by equal halves," which yields, "Every number is either odd or divisible by equal halves;<sup>749</sup>

Or of a conjunctive conditional proposition and a disjunctive conditional proposition, like our statement, "As long as this is a human, he is a creature, and every creature is either white or black," which yields, "As long as this is a human, he is either white or black."

Damanhūrī's Īḍāḥ al-Mubham (14−15) and Imām Akhdarī's commentary of his Sullam (34), while most of the examples were taken from Imām Ḥabannaka∥s Dawābit al-Ma'rifa (24763).

By understanding the moods that yield sound conclusions for all four figures, one understands that any other conceivable mood for any figure does not yield a sound conclusion, and is hence invalid (Damanhūrī 15).

In addition, the conclusion for all valid moods always follows the lower state of each premise, lower states referring to negation and particularity (Damanhūrī 15).

47 Or for example, "Every time they ignite the fire of war, Allāh puts it out" (Qur'ān 5:64); and every time Allāh puts out the fire of war, its evil stops. Hence, Every time they ignite the fire of war, its evil stops (Habannaka 240).

48 Or for example, "Whatever you put forth for yourselves of good, you will find it with Allāh" (Qur'ān 2:110); and every good with Allāh is a beautiful gift. Hence, whatever you put forth for yourselves of good, you will find its reward to be a beautiful gift (Ḥabannaka 240).

**49** Or for example, the prophetic hadīth "Every person goes out in the morning and then sells his soul, either freeing it or destroying it" (Muslim, Tirmidhī), which can be presented in the following syllogism:

Every person goes out in the morning and then sells his soul; and whoever sells his soul either frees it by selling it to the All- Merciful, or destroys it by selling it to the devil. Hence, every person goes out in the morning and then sells his soul, either freeing it or destroying it (Habannaka 241).

50 The syllogism by exclusion is always conditional in that its major premise (kubrā) is a conditional proposition, either conjunctive or disjunctive.

If it is conjunctive, the syllogism yields a conclusion in only two cases—exclusion of the antecedent itself, and exclusion of the contradictory of the consequent—as presented above. Exclusion of the consequent itself does not yield a conclusion, nor does exclusion of the contradictory of the antecedent. For example, in the syllogism "If this is a human, then it is a creature," the exclusion of the consequent itself "And indeed, it is a creature," or of the contradictory of the antecedent "However, it is not a human," yields no conclusion. Hence for such a syllogism, there are two valid moods and two invalid moods (Damanhūrī 16).

Examples of its valid moods are as follows:

"Had there been therein gods besides Allāh, they both (the heavens and the earth) would have been disordered" (Qur'ān 21:22); however, they are not disordered. Hence, there are no gods besides Allāh. وَأَمَّا الْقِيَاسُ الْاِسْتِثْنَائِيُّ فَالشَّرْطِيَّةُ الْمَوْضُوْعَةُ فِيْهِ إِذَا كَانَتْ مُتَّصِلَةً [مُوْجَبَةً لُزُوْمِيَّةً] فَاسْتِثْنَاءُ عَيْنِ الْمُقَدَّمِ يُنْتِجُ عَيْنَ التَّالِيْ كَقَوْلِنَا إِنْ كَانَ هذَا إِنْسَاناً فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ لكِنَّهُ إِنْسَانٌ فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ. وَاسْتِثْنَاءُ نَقِيْضِ التَّالِيْ يُنْتَجُ نَقِيْضَ الْمُقَدَّمِ كَقَوْلِنَا إِنْ كَانَ هذا إِنْسَاناً فَهُو َ يَكُوْنُ إِنْسَاناً فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ لكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِحَيَوَانٍ فَلا يَكُوْنُ إِنْسَاناً. وَإِنْ كَانَتْ مُنْفَصِلَةً حَقِيْقِيَّةً فَاسْتِثْنَاءُ عَيْنِ أَحَدِ الْجُزْءَيْنِ يُنْتِجُ نَقِيْضَ الآخرِ، وَاسْتِثْنَاءُ نَقِيْضَ عَيْنَا إِنْ كَانَ عَيْنَ الْآخَرِ، وَاسْتِثْنَاءُ نَقِيْضٍ التَّابِي يُنْتَعِهُ عَانَ يَعْبَ

As for a syllogism by exclusion, if the conditional statment were a [mandatory] conjunctive [affirmative] proposition, then exclusion of the antecedent itself yields the consequent itself, like our statement, "If this is a human, then it is a creature. And indeed, it is a human; hence, it is a creature." Exclusion of the contradictory of the consequent yields the contradictory of the antecedent, like our statement, "If this is a human, then it is not a creature; hence, it is not a human."<sup>50</sup>

If it were a literal disjunctive proposition, then exclusion of one of the two parts itself yields the contradictory of the other part, and exclusion of the contradictory of one of the two parts yields the other part itself.<sup>51</sup>

"Had he [Prophet Yūnus] not been amongst those who glorify (Allāh), he would have tarried in its belly until the Day in which they are resurrected" (Qur'ān 37:143–4); however, he did not tarry in its belly until that Day. Hence, he was amongst those who glorify (Allāh).

"Had it [faith in this religion] been good, they [the believers] would not have preceded us to it" (Qur'ān 46:n1); however, they preceded us to it. Hence, it is not good. This is the statement of the polytheists regarding the religion and the believers|| preceding them in faith; the syllogism, of course, is invalid, as its major premise is not true, since their preceding them in faith in no way indicates that the religion is not good.

"Were he to invent words regarding Us, We would surely have taken him by the right hand, and then severed his very aorta" (Qur'ān 69:44–6); however, We did not take him by the right hand and sever his aorta. Hence, he did not invent any words regarding Us (Habannaka 274–5).

**51** For a syllogism of exclusion with a disjunctive conditional proposition as its major premise, that premise must be affirmative. In addition, either the major premise or the minor premise (which begins with the particle of exclusion "however" or "and indeed") must be universal, or singular (since it is effective universal) (Habannaka 278).

If the major premise of a syllogism of exclusion is disjunctive, it is either mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive (or literal), mutually exclusive only, or totally exhaustive only. The first type is discussed above in the text; it has four valid moods. For example in the syllogism, "A number is either even or odd," exclusion of either part yields the contradictory of the other part; that is, "However, it is even," yields "Hence, it is not odd," and "However, it is odd," yields "Hence, it is not even." Also, exclusion of the contradictory of either part yields the other part itself; that is, "However, it is not even," yields "Hence, it is odd," and "However, it is not odd" yields "Hence, it is even."

The second type, if the major premise is mutually exclusive only, has two valid moods, as exclusion of one of the two parts itself yields the contradictory of the second part, and two invalid moods, as exclusion of the contradictory of one part does not yield anything. For example in the statement, "This thing is either white or black," exclusion of white "However, it is white" yields the contradictory of black "Hence, it is not black," and vice-versa. Yet exclusion of the contradictory of white "However, it is not white" or the contradictory of black "However, it is not black" yields nothing.

The third type, if the major premise is totally exhaustive only, also has two valid moods and two invalid moods, the exact opposite of the above. For example in the statement, "Zaid is either in a body of water, or is not drowning," exclusion of the contradictory of one part yields the other part itself, and vice-versa. "However, he is not in a body of water" yields "Hence, he is not drowning," and

"However, he is in a body of water," or "However, he is not drowning," yield no conclusions (Damanhūrī 16–17).

## [The Five Skills]

الْبُرْهَانُ هُوَ قِيَاسٌ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنْ مُقَدِّمَاتٍ يَقِينِيَّةٍ لِإِنْتَاجِ الْيَقِينِ. وَالْيَقِينِيَّاتُ سِتَّةُ أَقْسَامٍ: أَوَّلِيَّاتٌ كَقَوْلِنَا الوَاحِدُ نِصْفُ الاِثْنَيْنِ وَالْكُلُّ أَعْظَمُ مِنَ الجُزْءِ. وَمُشَاهَدَاتُ كَقَوْلِنَا الشَّمْسُ مُشْرِقَةٌ وَالنَّارُ مُحْرِقَةٌ. وَمُحَرَّبَاتٌ كَقَوْلِنَا شُرْبُ السَّقَمُونِيَا يُسَهِّلُ الصَّفْرَاءَ. وَحَدْسِيَّاتٌ كَقَوْلِنَا الشَّمْسُ مُشْرِقَةٌ وَالنَّارُ مُحْرِقَةٌ. وَمُحَرَّبَاتٌ وَمُتَوَاتِزَاتٌ كَقَوْلِنَا شُرْبُ السَّقَمُونِيَا يُسَهِّلُ الصَّفْرَاءَ. وَحَدْسِيَّاتٌ كَقَوْلِنَا الشَّمْسُ مُشْرِقَةٌ وَالنَّارُ مُحْرِقَةٌ. وَمُحَرَّبَاتُ وَمُتَوَاتِرَاتٌ كَقَوْلِنَا مُحَمَّدٌ ﷺ ادَّعى النُّبُوَّةَ وَأَظْهَرَ الْمُعْجَزَةَ. وَقَضَايَا قِيَاسَاتُهَا مَعَهَا كَقَوْلِنَا الْأَرْبَعَةُ زَوْ جُ

Absolute Proof (*burhān*): a syllogism composed of premises of certainty to yield a conclusion of certainty.<sup>52</sup>

There are six types of premises of certainty:

1. Inherent, a priori premises (*awwaliyyāt*),<sup>53</sup> like our statement, "One is half of two," or "A whole is larger than its part."

2. Perceived premises [with the senses] ( $mush\bar{a}had\bar{a}t$ ),<sup>54</sup> like our statement, "The sun is shining," or "The fire is burning."

3. Empirical premises (*mujarrabāt*), like our statement, "Seammony is a laxative of yellow bile."

4. Conjectural premises ( $hadsiyy\bar{a}t$ ), like our statement, "The light of the moon is derived from the light of the sun."

52 An example of an absolute proof found in the Qur'ān is that of recreation of created things, presented in the following syllogism by exclusion:

He who is able to create something from nothing is able to recreate it after its death and annihilation, as the two are equivalent; and indeed, Allāh Most High is able to create things from nothing. Hence, He is able to recreate anything as well (Ḥabannaka 298).

53 That is, a premise that the intellect grasps without any need of reflection (Damanhūrī 18).

54 Some also included in this category what are termed wujdāniyyāt, that is, premises perceived by internal senses without need of thought, such as hunger, thirst, pleasure, or pain (Damanhūrī 18).

55 This statement was taken from another copy of the text (Mutūn al-Mantiq wa 'l-Ḥikma).

The goal of disputation is to overcome one's adversary or to convince someone who is incapable of understanding an absolute proof (burhān) (Damanhūrī 18). Other examples are as follows: We deem the following things as good and beautiful: spreading peace, feeding the hungry, maintaining kinship ties, speaking truthfully, and having laws based on justice.

We deem the following things as evil and repulsive: harming one s fellow man, killing animals, spreading calumny, and returning a favor with ingratitude and trangression.

Yet these premises are not at the level of certainty only if we do not consider their origins from divine legislation; if we do consider their origins, they are rendered premises of certainty.

An example from the Qur'ān is based on verses such as: "Should We then treat those who submit as [We do] criminals? What is the matter with you? How do you judge?" (68:35–6), and "Or should We treat those who believe and perform righteous acts as [We do] trangressors in the earth, or should We treat the pious as [We do] the corrupt?" (38:28).

This argument can be presented as follows: If a Day of Recompense and Accounting were not a reality, then this life would entail equal treatment of those who submit and criminals, thereby rendering the Creator unjust; however, His attribute of justice is an affirmed reality. Hence, there cannot be equal treatment of those who submit and criminals; hence, there must 5. Uninterrupted premises [transmitted by multiple chains of narration] (*mutawātirāt*), like our statement, "Muḥammad claimed prophecy, and performed initimable miracles." "However, he is drowning" yields "Hence, he is in a body of water." However, exclusion of one part itself is an invalid mood;

6. Instinctive premises, whose syllogisms are implicitly present, like our statement, "Four is even," by means of an intermediary that is present in the mind, namely, division into two equal parts.

وَالْجَدَلُ وَهُوَ قِيَاسٌ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنْ مُقَدِّمَاتٍ مَشْهُورَةٍ [لا مُسَلَّمَةٍ عِنْدَ النَّاس أَوْ عِنْدَ الخصْمَيْن كَقَوْلِنَا الْعَدْلُ حَسَنٌ وَالظُّلْمُ قَبِيْحٌ].

Disputation (*jadal*): a syllogism composed of well-known premises [but not conceded to, according to people or according to the two adversaries, like our statement, "Justice is beautiful, and oppression is repulsive"].<sup>55</sup>

وَالْخَطَابَةُ وَهِيَ قِيَاسٌ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنْ مُقَدِّمَاتٍ مَقْبُولَةٍ مِنْ شَخْصٍ مُعْتَقَدٍ فِيهِ أَوْ مَظْنُونَةٍ.

Oration (*khațāba*): a syllogism composed of either premises that are accepted from a someone trustworthy, or of presumed premises.<sup>56</sup>

وَالشِّعْرُ وَهُوَ قِيَاسٌ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنْ مُقَدِّمَاتٍ تَنْبَسِطُ مِنْهَا النَّفْسُ أَوْ تَنْقَبِضُ.

Provocation (*shi*'*r*): a syllogism composed of premises by which the soul is either expanded or constricted.<sup>57</sup>

be a Day of Recompense and Accounting. The Last Day, then, is an affirmed reality (Ḥabannaka 299–300).

56 An example of a presumed premise is "This person does not interact with people, and whoever does not interact with people is arrogant; hence, this person is arrogant." The goal of oration is to incite the listener to that which will benefit him, whether in this life or the next (Damanhūrī 18).

Most worldy affairs and personal matters are based on presumed premises, that are not absolutely certain yet still given enough due consideration whereby they can be relied upon in dayto-day life. These include laws of a nation-state, court rulings based on evidence, and even scientific theories (that form the foundation of modern medicine and technology), as all of these are very much based on presumption, even if strong and close to certainty.

Many Qur'ānic examples of presumed premises are often centered around proving divine oneness, such as the following verse:

"He strikes for you a parable from your own selves—do you have, among those whom your right hands possess, any partners in that which We provide for you, such that you are equal therein? Do you fear them as you fear each other? Such do We explain [Our] signs for people of intellect" (Qur'ān 30:28).

That is, O polytheists who ascribe to Allāh partners from His own creation, from His own servants, would you be content with the same for yourselves, with respect to the slaves that you own? Would be content with your slaves being partners with you in that which you own, vying with them in those possessions? Do you fear them as you do yourselves, conceding to their partnership with you?

If you are not content with that, due to what it would entail of your rank being lowered in your estimation, then are you content with the same for your Creator? (Habannaka 301–2).

57 For example, "Wine is a flowing ruby." The goal of provocation is to cause a reaction in the soul to incite it towards, or to discourage it from, something (Damanhūrī 18). It is based primarily on emotion, and is commonly used in poetry (Habannaka 302).

وَالْمُغَالَطَةُ وَهِيَ قِيَاسٌ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنْ مَقَدِّمَاتٍ كَاذِبَةٍ شَبِيهَةٍ بِالْحَقِّ أَوْ بِالْمَشْهُورِ أَوْ مِنْ مُقَدِّمَاتٍ وَهْمِيَّةٍ كَاذِبَةٍ.

Logical Fallacy (*mughālața*): a syllogism composed of either false premises that appear to be true or well-known premises; or of delusionary, false premises.<sup>58</sup>

وَالْعُمْدَةُ هُوَ الْبُرْهَانُ لاَ غَيْرُ.

وَلْيَكُنْ هذا آخِرُ الرِّسَالَةِ في الْمَنْطِق.

The only reliable syllogism [of these five types] is Absolute Proof (*burhān*), nothing else.

This concludes the treatise in logic.

58 Such as the statement regarding a picture of a horse on a wall, "This is a horse, and every horse neighs; hence, this neighs." This type of syllogism is also termed sophistry (safsaṭa) or quarrelling (to create discord) (mushāghaba); it is unlawful (ḥarām) in all of its types. Among the worst of its types is an unrelated fallacy (mughālaṭa khārijiyya), which is for the debater who has no understanding and no willingness to submit to the truth to distract the focus of his adversary with that which confuses him—such as vulgar speech—so as to show people that he has overcome him, by which he covers up his own ignorance. This is common in our time; rather, it is the current situation. This type of syllogism, then, must be learnt as a type of protection, but not for use, except out of necessity such as to repel an obstinate disbeliever. It is therefore like poison, in that it is not to be used except for the vilest of illnesses (Damanhūrī 18).

# CONTENTIONS 11

Written and Commentated on by Shaykh Abdal Hakim Murad





# **CONTENTIONS #11**

1. Augustine: man's deformity. Ishmael: his deiformity. (Defy, don't deify.)

2. Peace without justice is not peace at all.

3. A *faqih* in first class? And pigs will fly...

4. The Dajjal will only be king when only the blind are left in the valley.

5. British Islam: 'We came as rebels, and found ourselves to be heirs.' (Gershom Scholem)

6. The Liber Asian is the reconciliation between Edom and Juda-yi Ism.

7. Your greatest liability is your lie-ability.

8. No-one is more extroverted than the contemplative saint.

9. Modernity: an accelerating attempt to shovel matter into the growing hole where religion used to be.

10. The Liber Asian vs. the Manu Mission: a woman may be Arahat on Arafat.

**11**. Arabdom is not congenital. 12. Jesus said 'Allah', not 'Deus.' ('Say: Allah! and leave them plunging in their confusion.') 13. 'Never despise any Muslim, for the least of the Muslims is great in the eyes of God.' (Abu Bakr al-Siddiq r.a.). 14. Remember: you once knew the whole Qur'an.

15. *Wara'* is the shift from fear to hope.

16. Only if the body is the temple of the spirit does the veil not belong to the high priest.

17. We do not lack a rib, we lack a lung.

18. Islam, not the Cross, is foolishness to the Greeks.

19. Redefine religion, but do not derefine it.

20. If worship is the purpose of creation, then the Founder is the purpose of creation.

21. Anthropomorphism is gender-biased.

22. Theology is the quest for the least silly definition of God.

23. Love, not Reform, establishes the dignity of 'autonomy'.

24. *Ma'ruf* and *munkar* are defined by the *fitra*.

**25**. Forget not the Other in the Brother.

**26**. Revelation is the opposite of the cluster bomb.

27. Zionism: God's sword unsheathed against Jerusalem.

28. Those who look for sin often strengthen it.

29. Nafs is a comedian. So enjoy your Sufism!

30. The *fitra* tells us that nature is a medicine. The Sunna allows us to take it.

31. See things coolly. You will not think more clearly by worrying that you worry.

32. Who were more anti-Western: the Taliban, or the Buddhas of Bamiyan?

33. Islam is the learning of mercy.

34. Islam is the crown of the poor.

35. Approach the teacher as the comet approaches the sun.

36. Third World Christianity: worship a white man, and be saved from your past! 37. Jesus did not oppose Rome, and so Rome chose him for its god. 38. If you have not seen the saint, you have not seen the Sunna. 39. Being heretics to the Monoculture requires both courage and style. But we should have room for those who have neither courage nor style.

**40**. People will not come closer to you if you hit them.

41. To learn truth is always to relearn. To lapse into falsehood is not always to relapse.

42. 'What can I say – it must have been the will of God.' (Mikhail Gorbachev)

43. Use words in your preaching only if absolutely necessary.

44. Academic Islamic Studies is as foolish as it is because we are as foolish as we are.

45. 'For Allah created the English mad – the maddest of all mankind.' (Kipling)

**46**. The *hijab*: 'a display of modesty'!

47. The teacher exists to teach you the importance of what you have transcended.

48. The Sephardi and the Mizrahi mean something. But what does the Ashkenazy mean?

49. Maidens! Choose him that uses his ears more than his eyes.

50. The road to God is paved with laughter at the self. The road to Hell is paved with laughter at others.

51. Edom, then Ishmael: the superfetation of Juda-yi Ism. 52. Learn that you are the merest shadow of Another's act; thus you will learn humbleness, which is the beginning of understanding. 53. The world without hell is the word. 54. A heretic never claims to be a heretic, he claims to transcend orthodoxy.

55. Veils without turbans? Coronets without crowns?

# 56. Augustine is a jihadi.

57. The false Salafism: from catechism to cataclysm.

58. All true Reformers are by the nature of them Priests, and strive for a Theocracy.' (Carlyle, on Knox)

59. Do not think that anything has any purpose other than to point to God.

60. Idolatry, at best, is the unbalanced fixation on an Attribute.

61. Religious leadership is an opportunity to be frightened of God.

62. Do not say: Do you agree with me? but say: Do we agree?

63. Sufism: don't think that you can dive without lowering yourself.

64. Mockery is for pouring upon *kufr*, not upon people.

65. Wisdom consists mainly in the ability to recognise human weakness.

66. God's mercy is not limited; but He is not limited by His mercy.

67. For each karama that takes you forward, there are ten which will take you back.

68. Only those who know themselves to be unworthy are worthy.

69. If you do not sanctify the dawn, the day will not sanctify you.

70. Against Modernism: between signs and science there is neither rhyme nor reason.

71. Islamism: untie your camel, and trust in God.

72. Her voice is part of her awra only when it is part of her aura.

73. Lust before lustrations. Fast before frustrations.

74. If you suffer from listlessness, make a list.

75. Edom: In terms of the Parousia, there have been too many Years of Grace. In terms of salvation history, there have not been enough.

76. Europe: we shall not despise a minority, unless it is minarety

77. The caliphs' prayers ended with Hamidun Majid.

78. If you put the Sunna before mercy, you have lost both.

79. 'Nihilism is the uncanniest of all guests.' (Nietzsche)

80. If you are good, pretend to be bad. If you are bad, don't pretend to be good.

81.	To grow in the spirit, and not to grow in the need to pretend not to be what one is, is a contradiction that closes the Way.
82.	'If European education is the death of maternity / Then death is its fruit for the human race.' (Iqbal)
83.	The Ka'ba has a positive charge; we are negative. Dunya, however, is an efficient insulator.

84. He who knows himself, knows Islam.

85. Man is the proof of God. The man of God is the proof of religion.

86. Do not fear any extremist; fear the consequences of his acts.

87. Do not be complacent. Most people judge religions by their followers, not by their doctrines.

88. Only parasites respect flukes.

89. Only through tradition are we an *umma semper reformanda*.

90. Scripture defines mercy, but is not an alternative to it.

91. Justice may never be the consequence of wrath; but it may be its right assuaging.

92. Do not believe the confessions of tortured texts.

93. Being at ease in the company of scholars is a proof of faith.

94. Nobility is the aptitude for seeing beauty.

95. To slouch, and to suck one's pen, are signs that one has never read Scripture.

96. If their defences are strong, it is because you have not used the weapon of mercy.

97. Let the next hours be an apology for the sunna prayer. Let the sunna prayer be an apology for the fard. Let the fard be an apology for separation.

98. In the fight against the Monoculture, the main sign is the hijab, and the main act is the Prayer.
99. It's quite a hard thing to respect
A God who our prayers would accept,
We splash and we preen
Then we fidget and dream,
So proud to be of the Saved Sect.

100. 'May I not prove too much of a skunk when I shall be tried.' (Wittgenstein)

Layout design by Hanane Korchi

© 2013 Deen Intensive Foundation and its licensors. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part is prohibited without written permission from Deen Intensive Foundation.





www.deenintensive.com